“The unitary constitution of Nigeria is responsible for the woes and miseries of Nigeria and Nigerians… Break the cycle of elections that renew the life of that constitution.” — Tony Nnadi, NINAS, 26 February 2026.
Tony Nnadi’s stark appeal on 26 February is not an isolated provocation. He urged that Nigerians should suspend the voyage to the 2027 elections. He also called for an immediate, time-bound transition to rework the 1999 Constitution.
It is the most recent and concentrated expression of a long-running argument. Nigeria’s highly centralised constitutional architecture is believed to cause chronic corruption. It also leads to failing public services and a security collapse. This has turned wide swathes of the country into killing fields.
Nnadi’s remedy is bold, constitutional theatre. It involves a “Union Reset” implemented through the NINAS Five-Point Proposition. This reset is concluded within 12–15 months by staged regional referendums. It has real political consequences.
NINAS argues that dismantling the 1999 framework is necessary. It should be replaced with either a renewed federation, a confederation, or independent successor units. This is the only way to end the chokeholds that centralisation creates across security, payment systems, elections, and national utilities.
Why centralisation matters now
The Attorney-General’s recent public critique of the Federal Government’s centralised contract-payment regime gives Nnadi’s argument a mainstream echo.
The Justice Minister said the centralised payments model was initially sold as a transparency measure. However, it has produced bottlenecks that delay projects. It also creates new vectors for corruption.
That admission from the centre underlines a simple point. When finance, procurement, and major public functions are routed through one national hub, failure at that hub becomes systemic failure for every part of the country.
The architecture that enables this concentration is explicit and legal.
The 1999 Constitution’s Exclusive Legislative List vests the Federal Government with authority over scores of national matters. This list is commonly described as 68 items. It leaves states with narrowly circumscribed powers.
That design produces a cascade. It involves national control of security doctrine and the electoral machinery. It also includes control of the national grid and large contract disbursements.
The human effect is predictably bleak — slow service delivery, unaccountable procurement, and the steady institutionalisation of rent-seeking.
Security, sovereignty and outside actors
Nnadi frames the constitutional crisis as existential: that continued centralisation helps create conditions for large-scale, ethnically inflected violence.
Recent, deadly attacks have occurred across the northwest and north central regions. There are confirmed reports of expanding foreign involvement in training, arms sales, and even direct strikes. These developments complicate the security picture and raise the stakes of any constitutional conversation.
External partners, notably the United States, have recently deepened security cooperation with Nigeria. This comes amid rising militia and insurgent violence. Washington has also authorized major equipment sales. By some accounts, there have been limited troop deployments in trainer or support roles.
These developments mean that any internal constitutional rupture would be watched — and affected — by international security calculations.
Comparative perspective: what reconfiguration might look like
Comparative history offers several templates. Countries that have decentralised successfully typically phased change through legally anchored devolution. They practiced fiscal federalism and established local control over security policing. Staggered referendums gave local populations agency over the terms of union.
By contrast, abrupt and unilateral abolitions of constitutions tend to produce legal vacuums and invite violent contests for power.
NINAS acknowledges this risk. They propose a staged, referendum-driven sequence. This sequence would be time-bound and designed to deliver clear options to constituent peoples.
The difference between theory and practice will rest on credible institutions. These institutions will manage the transition. International guarantees will deter spoilers.
Political actors, parties and complicity
Nnadi is unsparing in his indictment of the political class. He says parties that campaign within the existing constitutional framework are, by design, gatekeepers of the abuses it produces.
There is a valid democratic rejoinder. Elections under the current constitution provide a non-violent mechanism for political change. Suspending them risks empowering extra-constitutional actors.
The Attorney-General’s admission about centralisation’s flaws makes the populist argument harder to dismiss. It forces parties to account for structural reform rather than cosmetic policy fixes.
Practical obstacles and the path to legitimacy
Any credible transition requires five essentials.
First, a cross-sectional consensus among civil society, professional bodies, faith leaders, labour and business.
Second, a legal mechanism that suspends only the electoral calendar while preserving basic civil liberties and the rule of law.
Third, transparent, internationally supervised referendums.
Fourth, an agreed timetable and binding dispute-resolution processes.
Fifth, security guarantees to prevent opportunistic violence during the vacuum that change might create.
NINAS’s Five-Point Proposition gestures to several of these elements; whether it can assemble the alliances required is the central question.
What the public faces: risk and reward
For many Nigerians, life involves chronic deprivation. They are subject to kidnappings. They feel frustration due to stalled public works. Nnadi’s rhetoric will feel like a necessary revolt against a system that has not delivered.
For others, the fear is disorder. A suspended election cycle could be the thin end of an undemocratic wedge. This situation invites military or partisan power grabs.
The balance between those outcomes is crucial. It will likely determine if the “Union Reset” becomes a constructive constitutional conversation. Alternatively, it could lead to a dangerous political rupture.
Concluding assessment
Tony Nnadi and NINAS have shifted the debate from policy reform to system change. Their proposition forces a reassessment of how power is organised in the Nigerian state. It questions whether the 1999 architecture still serves the national interest.
The Justice Minister’s critique of centralised payment systems has made that critique harder to dismiss as fringe grievance.
The next phase will test whether reformers can convert rhetorical force into institutional design. They must also manage the grave security and legitimacy risks. These risks attend any attempt to re-forge a country’s constitutional compact.
Nnadi Calls for Union Reset — End the 1999 Constitution
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