Atlantic Post

There is power in naming. When a nation refuses to name the true character of the violence that besets it, the remedies offered are shallow and the suffering grows. For years, Nigeria has been told a false narrative. The conflicts in communities across the Middle Belt and the north are described as a mosaic of pastoral disputes. They are often termed “farmers versus herders.” That framing is convenient. It flattens causes, absolves organised actors, and allows political interests to evade accountability.

I reject that shorthand. The perpetrators who burn villages, kidnap schoolchildren and seize territory are often organised militants. They are more likely trans-regional jihadi networks and criminal cabals than simply itinerant herders with grazing disputes. This is not a partisan provocation; it is a strategic truth we can no longer ignore.

To understand why the “farmer-herder” label is inadequate we must look at patterns and intent. Pastoral clashes are typically local, reciprocal and rooted in resource competition. By contrast, the massacres that have devastated communities in Benue, Plateau, Katsina and other states show hallmarks of asymmetric insurgency. These include mass killings, arson, forced occupation, and systematic abductions. In many cases, there is evidence of external logistical networks.

International and regional analysts have repeatedly warned about the dangers of oversimplification. Reducing those incidents to agrarian disputes obscures the role of organised militant factions and cross-border actors. When we misdiagnose the disease, our policy prescriptions, like light policing and local mediation, will fail.

Look at the human toll. Multiple surveys highlight Nigeria. Humanitarian agencies agree. Nigeria remains one of the countries with the largest numbers of displaced people. It also faces acute insecurity on the continent. The humanitarian architecture in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe has been strained for more than a decade by jihadi insurgency. Other regions now face escalating waves of violence. These waves force farmers off their land and into urban precarity.

Independent reviews and parliamentary briefings have noted tens of thousands of deaths. They also report the displacement of hundreds of thousands, if not more, across interlinked violent theatres over the last decade. These figures belie any comfortable “local dispute” narrative. This is a national security catastrophe, not an environmental disagreement.

Let us be clear about actors. Boko Haram splintered. It evolved into a constellation that includes Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). These are jihadi organisations with trans-regional ambitions, foreign ties and deliberate strategies to terrorise and govern by violence.

They have welcomed fighters and operatives beyond Nigeria’s borders in different phases. Treating them as part of a pastoral economy demeans the victims and handicaps strategic countermeasures. If we are to meet these threats, we must match tactics with precise intelligence, focused counterterrorism and international cooperation.

I have often invoked foreign examples to make a point about narrative and action. The campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria demonstrates how naming and sustained pressure change the battlefield calculus. The coalition effort that degraded and dismantled the IS territorial “caliphate” was complex. It involved many partners.

The Trump administration publicly declared the liberation of ISIS-held territory in March 2019. They emphasised a hardline posture that converged with continuing coalition and local ground force efforts.

President Trump insisted that to defeat an enemy, you must first be capable of naming it correctly. You must also name it correctly to solve a problem. He famously stated that the enemy that was being confronted in Iraq and Syria was Radical Islamic Terrorism. He declared that the days of political correctness was over.

That example illustrates a principle. A candid naming of the enemy, merged with political will, creates conditions for decisive results. Operational focus is also necessary. Nigeria needs comparable clarity.

But naming the enemy is only the first step. The second, and far more difficult, is changing the structures that allow violence to metastasise. The 1999 Constitution centralised power in ways that have repeatedly been critiqued by scholars and practitioners.

An over-concentrated executive has left communities feeling vulnerable. Weak local authority also contributes to this vulnerability. The persistence of an imposed constitutional order further excludes communities. When people lack effective local recourse, alternative, and often violent, authorities step into the breach.

Nigeria must reform governance. This change is essential to resist the infiltration of radical movements and criminal networks. Reform would give local communities real agency over their security and resources.

That is why I endorse the NINAS Five-Point Proposition as an urgently necessary contribution to the national conversation. These are not casual demands; they are a programme for reconfiguring the union and restoring political consent:

1. Formal recognition of grave constitutional grievances and sovereignty dispute by South and Middle-Belt peoples
2. Immediate decommissioning of the 1999 Constitution
3. Suspension of general elections under the disputed constitution
4. Establishment of a Transitional Authority of South and Middle-Belt peoples
5. Launch of a time-bound, two-stage reconfiguration process — regional constitutions via referendum or plebiscite, then negotiation of a renewed federation or independent units

One might not accept every element of NINAS. However, its urgency is undeniable. Communities demand a say in the structures that govern them. That demand can’t be evaded by euphemism or securitised silence.

What must happen next is straightforward in concept, painful in practice.

First, the security response must differentiate among criminal opportunists, jihadi insurgents, and local resource disputes. This can be achieved by investing in intelligence. Additionally, forensic analysis and regional cooperation are essential.

Second, governance must be decentralised so that local councils, customary institutions and state authorities can provide protection that residents trust.

Third, there must be a national constitutional conversation. It should finally tackle the claim that the 1999 text was imposed. This text was not consented to by millions of Nigerians.

Nigeria stands at a crossroads. We can persist with comfortable narratives that placate some elites. These narratives condemn entire communities to death. Alternatively, we can summon the political courage to name the enemies we face. We must reform institutions that allow impunity and negotiate a new constitutional order that restores sovereignty to the people.

History will judge us not by what slogans we choose but by whether our actions protected the weakest among us.

We need to speak plainly. We must act decisively. Rebuilding trust from the ground up is essential if we wish to survive as a republic that guarantees liberty and dignity. Anything less will be the slow administrative suicide of a nation that refused to see what it faced.

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