ABUJA, Nigeria — Nigeria’s security challenges have spiraled into a dispute between officials and critics. On 22 February 2026, Secretary to the Government George Akume told a Catholic bishops’ meeting that intelligence shows “many of these [attackers]…speak very poor Hausa, but they speak French. Do we speak French in Nigeria? No”.
He insisted most suspects in recent mass killings are non‑Nigerians who entered through porous borders.
The Federal Government has since highlighted cooperation with allies – notably a U.S. designation of Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” on religious freedom grounds – as proof of progress.
In sharp contrast, activists and opposition figures say Akume’s foreign-terrorist claim ignores evidence of local involvement.
Tony Nnadi, cofounder of the Indigenous Nationalities Alliance for Self‑Determination (NINAS), issued a pointed “rejoinder” on social media. He raised a raft of questions about state actors’ roles in the violence.
For example, Nnadi cites reports. According to these reports, before the 2015 election, an APC strategist publicly claimed that “in the lead up to the 2015 election, the APC imported terrorists into Nigeria”.
He also notes that Kaduna’s former governor Nasir El-Rufai admitted sending funds to armed “Hausa‑Fulani” groups abroad. Bauchi Governor Bala Mohammed explicitly described the Fulani as a transnational people.
As Bala said in 2019, “we cannot just close our borders and say the Fulani man is not a Nigerian”.
Nnadi and other critics argue these examples undermine the “foreign terrorists” narrative.
Yoruba activist Dele Farotimi, for instance, has flatly accused the ruling party of “complicity” in the killings. He demands the government “stop being complicit… The complicity of the APC government is established beyond argument”.
In the same speech Farotimi reiterated the 2015 claim: “the APC imported terrorists into Nigeria.”
Similarly, many observers point out that President Buhari held ceremonial posts in Fulani associations. These include Miyetti Allah. This raises conflict‑of‑interest concerns when those groups invade indigenous farming communities.
Nnadi’s critique extends to current leaders. He questions whether President Tinubu and Vice President Shettima, who both have Northern-Fulani ties, will truly confront militants embedded in parts of the security establishment.
The public response has been heated. Supporters of the FG say the focus must remain on hunting criminals, not political finger-pointing.
They note that government sources emphasize joint operations: drones and foreign intelligence help track cross-border bandits.
Indeed, officials insist that designating known Fulani gunmen as part of established terror networks justifies foreign cooperation. Nevertheless, Nigeria’s image on the world stage has suffered.
In late 2025 the U.S. State Department took action. It formally re‑listed Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” for religious freedom. This was due to “severe violations of religious freedom” against Christians.
U.S. lawmakers responded. In March 2025, the House Africa subcommittee held hearings on “Conflict and Persecution in Nigeria.” Senator Ted Cruz introduced a bill to sanction Nigerian officials for alleged complicity.
President Tinubu has protested. He wrote that Nigeria is unfairly portrayed as intolerant. The government is working sincerely to protect all citizens.
Establishment leaning experts say Nigeria’s crisis has many layers. Beyond the immediate clashes, there are long‑standing grievances over land, poverty and governance.
Some conflict analysts warn of disinformation: accusations that rank outsiders (e.g. foreign jihadists) are behind all violence are often viewed as an attempt to divert blame from institutional failures.
For instance, Benue’s Governor Hyacinth Alia is a Catholic priest. He publicly rejected talk of “genocide” or “jihad” in his state. He said, “we don’t have any religious, ethnic…genocide.” We don’t have that” and “We do not have any jihad in Nigeria”.
Critics like Nnadi, nonetheless, counter that denying the ideological motive does not address alleged state collusion. They point to minority reports of security forces ignoring or even abetting militants.
The truth likely falls somewhere between these extremes.
Violent raids, kidnappings, and ambushes occur frequently. Heavily armed herdsmen and jihadists carry out these actions across borders.
It is also clear that some local officials have been accused of negligence or worse.
Current and former military officers have in media interviews long alleged this. Insurgent groups once enjoyed tacit support from elements within previous governments.
No comprehensive inquiry has yet confirmed or debunked those claims fully.
For now, Nigerians remain mired in this blame game. Officials emphasize foreign links to harness international aid and expertise. Campaigners insist every angle of domestic responsibility must be investigated.
As Farotimi put it, only by ending government “complicity” can such bloodshed end. Moving forward, many analysts say, an impartial probe – possibly involving judicial or even UN mandates – is needed.
Such a review could examine border controls, past security directives, and potential cover‑ups.
Without that, Nigeria’s debate over “foreign terrorists versus state-sponsored violence” will likely continue, with ordinary citizens paying the price.
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