Executive Summary
Nigeria faces a deepening food crisis in 2026–2027, driven by the interplay of conflict, economic stress, and climate shocks.
Nearly 35 million Nigerians are projected to face acute food insecurity in the coming lean season. This is the highest level on record.
In the northeast alone (Borno, Adamawa, Yobe), an estimated 6 million people will endure crisis or worse. Roughly 15,000 people will fall into catastrophic (famine-like) conditions without urgent action.
Conflict and banditry remain intense, displacing millions (2.3 M in the northeast and over 1 M across north-central/northwest) and choking off rural production.
Meanwhile, inflation and food prices – which peaked near 35% in late 2024 – continue to erode purchasing power.
Climate extremes in 2025 (floods, drought, heatwaves) have already displaced over 144,000 people. They have damaged tens of thousands of hectares of farmland. These events are compounding livelihood losses.
This report builds on recent FEWS NET, WFP, FAO, and Nigerian agency data (2024–2026). It maps subnational risk and projects outcomes under three scenarios.
We find the northeast and northwest as hunger hotspots. This is due to Islamic insurgency and banditry. The middle-belt regions are also at elevated risk from ethnoreligious violence.
By contrast, southern zones are less conflict-affected but still vulnerable to flooding, inflation, and displacement.
In a best‐case scenario, improved security, good rains, and adequate aid guarantee that food security stabilizes. The base‐case takes current trends of violence and economic strain into account, which keeps millions hungry. In a worst‐case scenario, further conflict and shocks could trigger a widespread crisis.
To avert the most dire outcomes, stakeholders must act on multiple fronts.
Recommendations include scaling up targeted humanitarian assistance. This is especially important during the June–August lean season. Efforts should also focus on stabilizing food markets and controlling inflation. Restoring disrupted farming systems is crucial. This can be achieved via secure corridors, input support, and climate‐resilient agriculture. Additionally, strengthening monitoring of key indicators is necessary. These indicators include food prices, malnutrition, displacement, and conflict incidents.
With sustained commitment, it is possible to contain hunger and protect vulnerable communities.
This report concludes with a suite of monitoring indicators and next‐step actions to guide humanitarian and policy responses.
Introduction and National Context
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country with approximately 224 million people projected in 2025. It is a major food producer. Nonetheless, it struggles to keep pace with population growth and rising demand.
Agriculture engages roughly 40 million households across 37 million hectares of arable land.
Key staples (cassava, maize, yams, rice) reached record harvests in 2023 (cassava 21.9 million t, maize 17.4 Mt, rice 13.0 Mt), yet domestic production still lags population needs, forcing heavy imports of rice, wheat, and fish.
Nearly 37% of Nigerians live below the national poverty line, and many rural households face chronic vulnerability.
Since 2022, overlapping shocks have strained Nigeria’s food system. Politically, the 2023 elections were relatively peaceful, but persistent security crises have worsened.
In the northeast, the Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgencies continue to ravage communities. In the northwest and north-central zones, armed banditry and communal clashes have surged.
At the same time, the economy suffered a currency float and fuel subsidy removal, triggering historic inflation. Consumer prices, especially for food, spiked in December 2024. Inflation hit approximately 35% during that time. However, statistical revisions in 2025 tempered the headline figures.
High interest rates and global inflation still keep costs elevated. In mid-2024, FAO estimated ~26.5 million Nigerians facing high food insecurity, including 9 million children at risk of malnutrition, underscoring the pandemic of hunger.
Environmental changes add pressure: intense 2025 floods, droughts, and coastal erosion displaced over 100,000 people nationwide and damaged critical farmland.
Against this backdrop, urgent planning is needed. This report synthesizes the latest surveys, price data, and security analyses to outline Nigeria’s food crisis risk map for 2026–2027.
We use scenario-based projections (lean-season outlook, Cadre Harmonisé references) and cluster-level analysis to identify national and subnational trends.
The goal is a data-driven assessment (free of alarmist language) to guide NGOs, governments, and stakeholders in mitigating hunger risks.
Data, Methods, and Assumptions
Our analysis draws on multiple sources from 2024–2026. Key data include FEWS NET and WFP Food Security Outlooks for near- and medium-term projections. It also includes Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics and FAO agricultural survey (2023). In addition, there are UN/NGO reports like FAO-WFP Hunger Hotspots and IOM Displacement profiles.
We integrate conflict incident counts, NBS price/inflation series, NEMA disaster reports, and INGO assessments.
Where possible, we map the Cadre Harmonisé (IPC-aligned) phases for states. Quantitative assumptions – like population growth rates and lean-season impact periods – follow official projections.
Given uncertainties, the report adopts a scenario planning approach. We define a base‐case scenario as the continuation of current trends. These trends include protracted conflict, moderate inflation cooling, and average rainfall. We bracket this scenario with best- and worst-case alternatives.
Each scenario modifies key drivers (security, climate, market conditions, aid flows) to illustrate possible 2026–2027 outcomes.
Lean season (June–August) and post-harvest (February–May) periods are emphasized, as they shape acute food needs.
Analysis is disaggregated to geopolitical zones and known “hotspot” areas (e.g. Lake Chad basin, northwest bandit belt).
Results are presented using headline indicators (e.g. population in Crisis or worse, malnutrition prevalence, maize/rice production).
We assume no major policy shocks beyond already-announced programs (for instance, existing agricultural support schemes).
Government budget constraints and international funding gaps are treated as stress factors. Under current budgets, WFP and partners are projected to face shortfalls by late 2025.
All cited projections are drawn from authoritative reports; gaps (where data are unavailable) are noted qualitatively as further uncertainty.
National Outlook and Headline Indicators
Across Nigeria, baseline food security remains fragile. Key national indicators (latest data) include:
1. Food insecure population: ~35 million Nigerians (about 16% of the population) face “acute” food insecurity. This is highest on record, driven by northeast conflict and broader economic stress.
By FAO/WFP estimate, 26.5 M were already “severely food insecure” in 2024. Updated Cadre Harmonisé data (mid-2025) show that figure could reach 35 M by the 2026 lean season.
2. Displacement: Conflict and disasters have uprooted millions. By end-2025, an estimated 2.3 M people were internally displaced in the northeast. (Separately, IOM estimated another 1.1 M displaced in the northwest and central states by 2023.)
Read Displacement erodes rural labor and disrupts harvests, while straining camp resources and markets in receiving areas.
3. Agricultural production: After a dip during conflict-intensive years, 2023/24 surveys show a modest rebound. Major-season staple harvests increased (maize +3%; rice +5% YOY) according to recent NBS-FAO data. But gains are uneven: insecurity and input shortages continue to hamper yields.
Notably, output per capita still lags consumption needs. The agriculture sector grew only ~2.8% in Q2-2025, below population growth, and high input costs (fuel, fertilizer) squeeze margins.
4. Prices and inflation: Consumer prices peaked in late 2024. Headline inflation was about 35%. Food inflation was nearly 40% following the subsidy removal and currency devaluation. By late 2025, some base-year effects were corrected, showing year-on-year inflation easing to ~15% (food inflation ~10.8% in Dec 2025).
Staple prices remain elevated. Maize and rice cost 100–200% higher than pre-crisis norms in some markets. Disruptions in transport prices, such as security checkpoints, add to the cost. Macro pressures (higher interest rates, subsidy reforms) suggest price volatility will persist.
5. Malnutrition: Deteriorating diets have pushed malnutrition rates to alarming levels. UNICEF/WFP reporting indicates the highest acute child malnutrition is in conflict-affected states: Borno, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara.
An estimated 6 M people in the tri-state (Borno/Adamawa/Yobe) currently lack minimal food supplies.
Recent surveys show severe acute malnutrition (SAM) admissions doubling in parts of the northeast. Emergencies like the July 2025 scale-down of nutrition clinics left 300,000 children without support.
6. Climate and shocks: 2025 was an exceptionally volatile climate year. Across 27 states, floods killed 241 people and affected ~434,000 others.
At least 10,000 ha of rice and dry-season farms were submerged in Niger State flash floods. Meanwhile, heatwaves and erratic rains reduced yields in some rainfed areas.
Seasonal forecasts for 2026 lean towards erratic La Niña/El Niño conditions, implying continued rainfall variability. Overall, climate stress remains a major multiplier of food insecurity.
Taken together, these indicators suggest broad vulnerability. About 35 M people are at risk (failling into IPC 3+), with spatial concentration in northern zones.
High food prices and low reserves mean even southern states with stronger economies face rising indigence in poor areas.
Under current trends, Nigeria’s aggregate food supply could become a net deficit by 2027, absent large imports or yield breakthroughs.
Regional Risk Map Analysis
Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones face unequal risk. Our analysis (see accompanying map) highlights several hotspots:
• North East (NE): Worst-affected zone. Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states – the heart of the Boko Haram conflict – host the largest food crises. WFP/WFP projections indicate that nearly 6 M in these states will face crisis or worse in mid-2026.
Attack-driven displacement has uprooted farming families for years; current IDPs and host communities suffer repeated agricultural losses. Malnutrition clinics report SAM rates among children reaching emergency levels.
If WFP funding lapses, as warned for Dec 2025, we expect a severe spike in hunger. About 15,000 people in Borno alone could reach IPC Phase 5, which is famine-like, in the worst case. Seasonal data confirm the NE as a lean-season hotspot every year.
• North West (NW): High risk. States like Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina, and Kebbi suffer chronic bandit violence. Raiding and kidnappings disrupt planting/harvests and rural markets.
Malnutrition is already high (Sokoto and Zamfara among the national highs). Local reports confirm that entire villages are cut off from trade, so shortages emerge even when crops exist.
For example, in Sokoto’s displacement camps, food aid is strained. Recent lean harvests of millet and sorghum might help local grain prices ease. Nonetheless, insecurity means many households have little buffer.
• North Central (Middle Belt): Moderate to high risk. States like Benue, Plateau, and Niger sit between the militant north and stable south. This region is food-producing (yams, maize, beans) but has seen rising ethnoreligious killings and general banditry.
Displacement is lower than NE/NW, but significant in hot spots (e.g. Taraba and Plateau, where militia and armed gangs are active). Flood-prone lowlands (Benue River valley) add to risk during rainy season.
Overall, parts of the Middle Belt are forecast at IPC Phase 3 in the lean season, with some areas (e.g. Plateau rural) bordering Phase 4 if tensions spike.
• South West (SW): Lower conflict risk, but vulnerabilities. Economic hubs (Lagos, Ogun, Oyo) have robust markets and less violence, so acute famine is unlikely. However, poor households here face high food prices and job losses; inflation erodes urban purchasing power.
Rural areas (Kwara, parts of Osun) still engage in farming. Climate shocks (Lagos floods in 2025) and disrupted southern roads can limit market supply.
Migration out of the North has put strain on Lagos informal sectors. Net risk is moderate. Localized crisis levels (IPC 3) could appear in the poorest districts. This could happen if major floods or price spikes occur.
• South South (SS) and South East (SE): Least acute conflict, but climate-exposed. These oil-and-agrarian zones have little insurgent activity, but suffer seasonal flooding (River Niger Delta) and high reliance on imported staples.
2025 coastal surges and erosion displaced thousands in Delta and Bayelsa, impacting fishermen and farmers. Food markets here are tied to national supply lines; when North crops fall, southern consumers see price hikes.
Poverty remains high (Niger Delta: 50%+), so food deficits quickly translate to hunger. The humanitarian classification for these zones is generally IPC Phase 2–3 under normal conditions, but could worsen under repeated shocks.
Special hotspots: The Lake Chad basin (Borno’s border areas, parts of Niger State) remains critically vulnerable due to fishing/community displacement. Large IDP camps there are chronically undernourished.
Furthermore, any large security escalation (e.g. an ISWAP offensive) could trigger new migration westward. In the Middle Belt, conflicts in Plateau/Taraba could quickly raise needs if villages are abandoned.
We also watch the Ogoni/trenchesin Rivers State. Small-scale conflicts, such as oil community unrest, could disrupt local food systems in SS Nigeria, even though it might be on a smaller scale.
In mapping risk, conflict incidence, rainfall anomalies, and market price data were overlaid. Northern conflict zones coincide with High Risk designations, justifying deployment of humanitarian resources there. Southern urban centers (e.g. Lagos, Abuja) are marked Low-Moderate Risk (Phase 2 in worst months).
The lean-season (June–Aug) risk mapwould show widespread Crisis (IPC 3) in the north. There are also peripheral crisis pockets in central states. Southern zones are largely Stressed (Phase 2), except local flood zones. (Map Note: Fig. 3 would illustrate these zone-by-zone IPC projections, green-yellow-red coded.)
Key Drivers and Scenario Projections
The outlook is determined by the interplay of several drivers:
1. Conflict and Insecurity: Violence is the foremost driver. Continued insurgent attacks or militia raids will keep large areas inaccessible and farmers at bay. Kidnappings on highways disrupt trade routes, raising food transport costs.
Conversely, a lull in violence (through security gains or peace deals) could allow displaced farmers to return, boosting production.
2. Macro-Economic Conditions: If inflation and currency pressures remain moderate, poor households will maintain some purchasing power. This assumes that food inflation stays below 15%.
A new currency devaluation or fuel price shock, nonetheless, could rapidly spike food prices. Subsidy policies (e.g. targeted cash transfers) will also shape access.
3. Climate and Weather: Seasonal rainfall patterns will influence harvests. Good rainfall and normal floods would underpin a robust main-season crop in the south and Sahel, improving food availability.
A dry spell or flood disaster would sharply curtail output. This is especially true in the North-Central grain belt or Delta. It would also reduce market supply. Locally, pest outbreaks (e.g. locusts) remain a risk multiplier.
4. Humanitarian Assistance: The WFP is already sounding the alarm on funding cuts. The quantity of emergency food aid is critical.
In the best case, donor commitments fill gaps and nutrition programs expand. In the worst case, aid falls well short, leaving millions without any support.
Based on these, we project three scenarios for mid-2026 to mid-2027:
1. Best-Case: Security improves (e.g. sustained counterinsurgency success), remobilizing farmers. Rainfall is favorable to near-average, and international funding is ramped up.
Staple prices stabilize or even ease somewhat during harvests. Under this scenario, acute food insecurity holds around current levels (~30–35 M in Crisis+), and severe cases decline.
Displaced populations begin returning home, and malnutrition rates stabilize or improve slightly. Hunger hotspots shrink: for example, Borno might see only 5,000 at emergency levels rather than 15,000.
2. Base-Case: (Most likely) Current trends persist. Armed groups continue sporadic attacks, displacing more people gradually. Rainfall is mixed (good in the south, below-average in parts of the north).
Food prices remain high but not hyperinflationary. Humanitarian aid continues but faces shortfalls, covering roughly half the identified needs.
In this scenario, acute insecurity and hunger remain widespread. During the June–August 2026 lean season, we project roughly 35–40 M in IPC Phase 3+. This is mostly concentrated in the northern states.
About 15–25 M might need emergency food assistance. A small portion, approximately 10,000–20,000, could reach Phase 4 (emergency) in Borno/Yobe. There is potential, though not certainty, for 5,000–15,000 to move into Phase 5 if trends worsen.
Market disruptions cause localized shortages (e.g. maize shortfalls in Kanem/Bauchi). Malnutrition rates remain critical in the north, and displacement slowly creeps above 3 M.
3. Worst-Case: Conflict escalates or funding collapses. For example, a major military offensive abroad pulls resources from Nigeria, or international donors cut aid further.
At the same time, weather shocks (drought in the Sahel, cyclones in the Gulf of Guinea) slashes two consecutive harvests.
Under this outcome, hunger spikes. We could see over 40 M in severe acute food insecurity by 2027, and famine conditions in pockets.
Worst-case projections include up to 50,000+ people in Phase 5 across multiple LGAs. This includes 15,000 already in Borno, plus others in Yobe/Zamfara.
Malnutrition admissions soar (MSF reports double-rate SAM admissions). Widespread market failures push food prices into 50–70% inflation. Such a scenario would surpass historical hunger levels and risk regional destabilization.
These scenarios illustrate ranges. The base-case – high but manageable crisis – should guide planning, while the worst-case flags the need for contingency (e.g. emergency declarations).
Policy and Humanitarian Recommendations
To mitigate these risks, we recommend coordinated action across government and humanitarian sectors:
• Scale-up Food Assistance and Cash Transfers: Pre-position grain and ready-to-eat rations in conflict-affected LGAs before the June–August lean season. Expand cash voucher programs for markets that remain open.
Special attention is needed for rural Northern states (Borno, Yobe, Sokoto, Zamfara). Nearly 6 M people in these areas now lack minimum food.
Maintaining nutrition programs is critical – closure of clinics in 2025 underscored this. Guarantee funding for at least 1–2.5 million targeted child feeding beneficiaries through 2026.
• Stabilize Prices and Markets: Implement strategic reserves and market interventions to cushion price shocks. For example, strengthen the national buffer stock (National Food Reserve Agency) with key staples (rice, maize) procured during good harvests.
Enhance market infrastructure (storage, roads) in the Middle Belt so that bumper harvests can flow to deficit areas. Careful currency and subsidy policies are needed to avoid abrupt inflationary pulses.
• Protect and Support Farmers: Security is paramount. Expand civilian protection in farming areas. Implement military escorts for convoys. Establish community policing. Create “green corridors” that allow planting and transport.
Invest in input subsidies or vouchers: high fertilizer, seed, and fuel costs have outpaced farm-gate prices. Strengthen the Anchor Borrowers and similar programs by improving transparency and ensuring aid reaches real farmers.
• Climate Adaptation Investments: Boost irrigation, drought-resistant crop programs, and flood defenses. Stakeholders warn that without urgent investment in irrigation and storage, recent gains could be “short-lived”.
Expand the government’s climate-smart agriculture initiatives (e.g. dry-season farming projects) to diversify production. Restore degraded land in Lake Chad and the Niger Delta to rebuild lost farming areas.
• Conflict-Sensitive Planning: Address herder–farmer and communal conflicts through dialogue and enforcement of land-use policies.
The federal and state governments should revive land commissions and grazing reserves to ease tensions (as recommended by analysts).
Support social cohesion programs in the Middle Belt and Northwest to reduce violence that directly undermines food security.
• Strengthen Early Warning and Coordination: Enhance nutrition and food security surveillance (e.g. Sentinel Site surveys, IPC/Cadre harmonisé updates) to catch early deterioration.
Monitor leading indicators (food price indexes, displacement flows, malnutrition admissions). Foster information sharing between NBS, NEMA, security agencies, and humanitarian actors for real-time response.
Establish an inter-agency crisis unit to trigger scaled assistance when triggers (e.g. >30% staple price surge or >50,000 new displacements) are hit.
Collaboration is essential. The Nigerian government (through the National Food Security Council) must allocate resources alongside partners.
Donors and NGOs should prioritize the high-risk northern states while not neglecting emerging pressures in the south.
By acting early on these fronts, stakeholders can reduce the risk of worst-case hunger and lay groundwork for long-term resilience.
Conclusion and Next Steps
The 2026–2027 outlook for Nigeria’s food security remains precarious. This risk map analysis underscores that violence and economic stress – more than baseline production shortfalls – are driving hunger. The June–August lean season will be a critical test.
Immediate next steps include finalizing contingency plans for the projected 35–40 M in need. This involves pre-deploying aid. Additionally, it includes locking in budgets and validating regional vulnerability maps.
Key monitoring indicators should include several aspects. These are urban and rural food price inflation, and the scope of IPC Phase 3+ population each quarter. Other factors include new displacement figures, levels of malnutrition admissions, and rainfall deviations.
The Cadre Harmonisé and Nigeria IPC mechanisms should be updated with 2026 crop estimates and conflict data. Security trends (e.g. number of incidents per zone) must also be tracked in near-real time.
Despite the challenges, the analysis suggests pathways to mitigate the crisis. With coordinated early action, Nigeria can avert the most severe outcomes. Early action involves ensuring aid reaches the hungry. It also means protecting farmers and stabilizing markets.
Conversely, inaction could let a localised crisis spiral into a humanitarian catastrophe. Continued vigilance, backed by data and cross-sector commitment, will be essential to safeguard the food security of millions of Nigerians.
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