Atlantic Post

On 3 June 2025, Sunday Dare, Special Adviser to President Bola Tinubu on Media and Public Communications, issued a blistering rejoinder to a factional statement by Afenifere, which labelled President Tinubu’s mid-term performance as a catalogue of “regression in human development, economic mismanagement and democratic backsliding”.

The State House decried this portrayal as “jaundiced” and “prejudiced”, pointing out that many of the criticisms merely echo opposition talking points.

According to the State House statement, a balanced examination of available data reveals a markedly different narrative – one of genuine progress under the “Renewed Hope Agenda”, despite formidable inherited challenges.

What follows is a detailed, critical and provocative dismantling of Afenifere’s claims, buttressed by recent statistics and expert analyses, that invites readers to question whether the faction’s position is rooted in fact or motivated by partisan persuasion.

1. Afenifere’s Political Posturing

Afenifere’s latest statement comes across as less a sober critique and more a calculated attempt to shape political discourse ahead of the 2027 elections.

This faction – purportedly representing progressive Yoruba opinion – conveniently neglects the fact that one of their own supported the principal opposition candidate in 2023.

By aligning with voices that are openly hostile to the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC), Afenifere’s gripe appears to serve a political end rather than foster genuine accountability.

Indeed, the statement’s blanket condemnation of Tinubu’s administration echoes the same rhetoric championed by opposition leaders, rather than engaging with nuanced policy debates.

Rather than advancing objective discourse, this indignant denunciation represents a transparent attempt to paint a half-empty picture, wilfully ignoring quantifiable achievements.

2. Economic Reforms: Beyond Short-Term Pain

2.1 Fuel Subsidy Removal and Fiscal Relief

The removal of the petrol subsidy on 29 May 2023 was undoubtedly painful for many Nigerians. Petrol prices tripled overnight, triggering widespread discontent and exacerbating living costs.

Critics describe this as an “unforced error”; however, the macroeconomic imperative was clear.

The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) estimated that the petrol subsidy in early 2023 cost the government over \$4 billion per month, accounting for almost 10 percent of total federal revenues.

By removing the subsidy, the Federal Government saved in excess of \$10 billion in 2023 alone, redirecting funds to critical sectors such as health, education and infrastructure.

Those who decry the subsidy removal often overlook that the pre-existing regime was fiscally unsustainable, with multiple exchange rate windows further draining scarce foreign exchange.

In fact, the unification of the naira and the end of the official black market eliminated distortions, strengthened investor confidence and laid the groundwork for long-term stability.

2.2 Foreign Exchange Reforms and Reserves Rebound

Under President Tinubu’s watch, Nigeria’s foreign exchange reserves rebounded spectacularly. By the end of 2024, net reserves surged from a precarious \$3.99 billion in December 2023 to \$23.11 billion.

Gross external reserves climbed to \$40.19 billion, the highest in over a decade, thanks to robust non-oil exports and improved capital inflows. This represents a seismic shift from the chronic shortages of foreign exchange that plagued the economy under the previous administration.

Moreover, the balance of payments swung into a \$6.83 billion surplus in 2024, reversing deficits of \$3.34 billion in 2023 and \$3.32 billion in 2022, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).

Rather than fostering pain, the reforms have created a firmer footing for external stability, which should ultimately translate into lower import costs and gradual exchange rate normalisation.

2.3 Inflation Dynamics

Afenifere contends that inflation has skyrocketed to “unimaginable levels” under Tinubu. While it is undisputed that inflation reached a 28-year high of 34.80 percent in December 2024, this spike was largely a residual effect of late 2023 devaluations and subsidy removal.

Crucially, by April 2025, headline inflation had moderated to 23.71 percent, down from 24.23 percent in March. Food inflation, the principal driver of cost-of-living pressures, also eased to 21.26 percent from 21.79 percent the previous month.

Considering that Nigeria’s inflation hovered around 16 percent throughout 2022, the recent double-digit rates reflect transitory adjustments and global supply-chain disruptions.

Importantly, the Monetary Policy Committee of the CBN has signalled that inflationary pressures are peaking and projects gradual easing toward single digits by Q4 2025, assuming continued fiscal discipline and uninterrupted food supply.

2.4 Trade Surplus and Macroeconomic Gains

Far from “economic deformities”, Nigeria recorded a trade surplus of N18.86 trillion in 2023, a direct outcome of reduced fuel imports and improved non-oil export earnings.

In Q4 2024, the economy delivered 3.84 percent GDP growth – the highest quarterly rate in three years – buoyed by resilient non-oil sectors such as agriculture, ICT and solid minerals.

Meanwhile, net foreign direct investment (FDI) commitments topped \$50 billion in 2024, underlining renewed investor confidence.

These figures dismantle the claim of “regression”; instead, they signal a nascent recovery, albeit one not yet fully felt by everyday Nigerians.

Critics conveniently ignore that a nation riddled with decades-long structural defects cannot pivot overnight; what matters is the trajectory, and that trajectory is indisputably upward..

2.5 Social Safety Nets and Cash Transfers

Recognising the hardship inflicted by reforms, the Tinubu administration expanded social safety nets. The National Social Safety-Net Coordinating Office (NASSCO) now covers over 5.7 million households under the Conditional Cash Transfer Programme, targeting the most vulnerable segments of society.

This outreach has been bolstered by N75 billion in palliative funds disbursed to states and local governments, facilitating a blend of food distribution and direct cash transfers.

Although distribution bottlenecks have sparked allegations of political interference, these measures remain crucial stop-gaps pending broader economic stabilisation.

Critics deride them as “propaganda”; yet, they pale compared to the previous government’s near-nonexistent palliative framework.

A truly balanced critique would acknowledge the need to refine targeting mechanisms while commending the administration for deploying resources in direct support of ordinary Nigerians.

3. Cost of Governance and the Oronsaye Report

Afenifere asserts that Tinubu’s government has ballooned administrative costs, wilfully ignoring the Oronsaye Report recommendations.

In reality, while the report has not been fully implemented – largely due to institutional resistance from vested interests – the administration has made headway in fiscal discipline.

Nigeria’s fiscal deficit shrank from 5.4 percent of GDP in 2023 to 3.0 percent in 2024.

Debt service-to-revenue ratios fell from nearly 100 percent in 2022 to under 40 percent by the close of 2024, reflecting the government’s efforts to curtail wasteful borrowing and non-productive spending.

In Q1 2025, federal revenues exceeded N6 trillion, partly due to the elimination of Ways and Means financing and some residual subsidy costs.

Yes, agencies have yet to be merged or scrapped in line with Oronsaye’s blueprint, but the narrower deficit and healthier revenue ratios demonstrate that the government is not indiscriminately spending.

Instead of hand-wringing over “rising governance costs”, opposition critics should acknowledge that controlling deficits and debt service obligations is a prerequisite for any sustainable social investment.

4. Allegations of Prebendalism and Corruption

4.1 Distribution of Palliatives

Afenifere’s claim that palliatives and mega-projects are skewed toward the “privileged and connected” carries weight, given Nigeria’s chronic governance deficits.

There have been credible reports of diversion and mismanagement, particularly in states where political cronies allegedly appropriated relief materials. However, it is disingenuous to label the entire scheme as a mere patronage racket.

The administration did suspend Humanitarian Affairs Minister Betta Edu in January 2024 over alleged misappropriation, signalling an intolerance for graft at high levels.

Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence of gatekeeping by local elites must inform calls for tighter transparency; blanket condemnation without acknowledging corrective steps taken – such as new digital tracking protocols – smacks of sour grapes.

The impulse to find fault in every palliative rollout conveniently erodes nuance while intangible gains such as community-level verifications remain overlooked.

4.2 EFCC’s Record-Breaking Convictions

It is tempting to dismiss any claim of anti-corruption zeal as “propaganda”. Yet, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) recorded 4,111 convictions in 2024 – its highest since inception – and recovered N364 billion alongside significant foreign-currency assets, including \$214.5 million, \$54,318.64 and 31,265 Euros.

Notably, in May 2025, the EFCC effected the final forfeiture of a sprawling 150,500 square-metre estate in Abuja, valued at over N50 billion, comprising 725 residential units.

The property was transferred to the Ministry of Housing, marking the Commission’s single largest asset recovery on record.

These milestones cannot be chalked up to “lip service”. They reflect an enforcement intensity that would have been unfathomable just two years ago.

That said, critics argue that convictions alone do not translate into systemic transformation; indeed, Nigeria’s corruption challenges run deep. Nevertheless, the tangible uptick in EFCC productivity rebuts the caricature of a wholly complicit administration.

5. Democratic Concerns and Centralisation

5.1 Independence of Judiciary and Legislature

Afenifere warns ominously of a slide toward “one-party state totalitarianism”. Such hyperbole misreads the evidence. The Supreme Court – widely regarded as the judiciary’s zenith – overturned the Tinubu-favoured Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) candidate in Kano State, endorsing the Labour Party’s victory; it also upheld opposition wins in Plateau and Abia.

Although the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) faced complaints about opaque appointments, there is no substantiated proof that appointees were active APC loyalists.

To suggest that the legislature has been neutered is equally unfounded: in May 2025, the Senate rebuffed a ministerial confirmation, chastising the executive for inadequate submissions, a rare display of assertiveness.

The jagged prongs of checks and balances remain operative; while imperfections exist, they are not evidence of a concerted drive toward authoritarian rule.

5.2 Protest Rights and State Responses

Afenifere’s allegation of suppression of peaceful protesters evokes painful memories of past crackdowns. However, official data show that between June 2023 and May 2025, at least 87 protests occurred, spanning clergymen demanding fuel price rollbacks to youth rallies calling for dialogue on education funding; none resulted in wholesale bans or mass detentions.

On isolated occasions when security forces employed force, it was ostensibly to prevent looting or violent escalation, rather than quell dissent per se.

While there remains room to strengthen protocols guiding security agencies’ engagement with demonstrators, painting every intervention as an affront to democracy is a fallacy.

Effective protest regulations can coexist with robust civil liberties; it is disingenuous to conflate occasional regrettable actions with an overarching design to stifle free expression.

6. Security and Social Welfare

6.1 Counter-Insurgency and Crime Reduction

Under Tinubu, the security architecture has registered discernible gains, even as threats persist. Official military communiqués confirm that over 13,500 terrorists, bandits and insurgents have been neutralised, with 7,000 arrests, between June 2023 and May 2025.

These operations, spanning joint task forces in the North East, South West and North West, have permitted farmers to return to fields, positively impacting food output and supply.

In addition, the Directorate of State Security Services (DSS) mounted successful covert interventions, dismantling at least four kidnap-for-ransom syndicates in the South-South region.

Though pockets of violence endure, these statistics underscore that Tinubu’s administration has marshalled resources and strategic alliances – including with state governors – to recalibrate the fight-and-rescue dynamic.

Consider that in early 2023, prior to these reforms, the military struggled to hold reclaimed territories; today, the narrative is one of habituated pushback rather than retreat.

6.2 Agricultural and Regional Development Drives

Recognising that security is intertwined with livelihoods, the Federal Government launched large-scale agricultural initiatives.

Over 500,000 metric tonnes of fertiliser were distributed in 2024, and 2,000 tractors procured for smallholder farmers across the North and Middle Belt, under the Anchor Borrowers’ Programme and the Presidential Agricultural Mechanisation Initiative.

These interventions align with the Renewed Hope Cities programme, designed to catalyse balanced development by constructing over 20,000 affordable housing units nationwide; as of May 2025, construction is ongoing on 5,000 units in Lagos, 4,000 in Kano, 3,500 in Rivers, and 3,000 in Kaduna.

Furthermore, the government established Development Commissions in each of Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones, a long-overdue step aimed at channeling federal resources toward region-specific infrastructure, youth empowerment and micro-enterprise support.

While implementation remains uneven, these ambitious blueprints signal a strategic pivot from piecemeal to programme-driven regional uplift.

7. Human Capital and Social Investments

7.1 Education and Youth Empowerment

Youth bulge is Nigeria’s greatest opportunity – and greatest threat. Tinubu’s administration has pumped resources into education financing and vocational training. NELFUND disbursed over N50 billion in student loans by April 2025, benefiting more than 600,000 students nationwide.

Concurrently, the Students’ Loan Scheme expanded technical and vocational tracks, with 150,000 youths enrolled in software development, tech support and data analytics under the “3 Million Technical Talent” (3MTT) project.

These initiatives complement the renewed NYSC stipend, raised from N33,000 to N77,000 in July 2024, alleviating living costs for fresh graduates posted to rural areas.

Critics deride these measures as insufficient, yet few argue that youth unemployment – which stood at 37 percent in 2022 – can be tackled without purposeful funding for skills acquisition.

As with any nascent programme, outcomes will hinge on meticulous monitoring and partnerships with private-sector players; overall, the trajectory suggests that leaders are at least attempting to stem the brain-drain and equip young Nigerians for a knowledge economy.

7.2 Health and Primary Care

Revitalising primary health care (PHC) has been a focal point, with the Federal Ministry of Health reporting that over 1,000 PHCs were fully revitalised between June 2023 and April 2025, while an additional 5,500 were undergoing upgrades.

Infectious disease rates in previously neglected rural areas have declined by an estimated 8 percent since mid-2024, according to the National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA).

The government’s expanded immunisation programme, facilitated by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, has improved coverage in northern states from 47 percent to 62 percent in under two years.

Though commentators highlight persistent shortages of trained medical personnel, these figures highlight incremental gains that, if sustained, could contribute to improved human development indices by the next United Nations Human Development Report.

8. Political Climate and 2027 Elections

8.1 Credit Ratings and Investor Confidence

In May 2025, Fitch Ratings upgraded Nigeria to a “B” with a stable outlook, citing the administration’s revenue reforms and improved debt sustainability.

Moody’s followed suit, bumping the rating from “Caa1” to “B3” and affirming a stable outlook, predicated on better fiscal buffers and curbed external vulnerabilities.

Such sovereign credit improvements—unthinkable two years prior—underscore that, contrary to Afenifere’s allegations, the global community is not blind to Nigeria’s economic strides.

While sceptics argue that Nigeria remains an opaque, corruption-prone environment, rating agencies typically do not upgrade without compelling evidence of positive policy shifts and administrative competence.

These upgrades should galvanise more favourable borrowing terms and further foreign portfolio inflows, laying the groundwork for more robust growth in the run-up to the 2027 elections.

8.2 Opposition Machinations and Disinformation

Allegations of “government-sponsored conflicts” within opposition parties persist, but tangible proof is scant. The Federal Government’s refusal to directly fund or incentivise internal opposition disputes stands in stark contrast to countries where such manipulations are overt.

Instead, what we have witnessed is a proliferation of fake news and AI-generated deepfakes circulating on social media, ostensibly to delegitimise potential challengers and create confusion among voters.

This tactic, which the State House has publicly denounced, is not unique to Nigeria; it reflects a global trend of digital misinformation. That said, casting every rumour as part of a grand conspiracy is naïve.

The administration must therefore invest in digital literacy and regulatory frameworks that balance the right to free expression with the urgent need to curb malicious disinformation—an essential endeavour as Nigeria gears up for what promises to be the most hotly contested elections in two decades.

9. Human Development: Progress in Context

Afenifere decries “regression in human development” under Tinubu, yet the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report for 2024 indicates that Nigeria’s Human Development Index (HDI) rose from 0.539 in 2023 to 0.548 in 2024, a marginal but meaningful uptick.

Though Nigeria still ranks 161 out of 189 countries, incremental progress is evident when contextualised against entrenched deficits in education, health, and income.

Life expectancy, which hovered at 54.3 years in 2023, edged up to 55.1 years, partly due to improved PHC services and the roll-out of community health workers.

School enrolment rates for primary education rose from 61 percent to 63 percent, signalling modest improvements in education access.

To be sure, these gains remain too slow and need amplification; yet, they contradict the narrative of outright regression championed by Afenifere.

A sober assessment recognises that reversing decades of underinvestment demands sustained effort – but recognising incremental wins is not tantamount to complacency.

10. Rebutting the Half-Empty Perspective

10.1 Balanced Critique versus Partisan Polemics

What Afenifere overlooks is that, while Nigeria grapples with endemic poverty and security threats, no modernisation drive can succeed without short-term dislocations.

Currency devaluations, subsidy removals and tax reforms invariably inflict hardship on vulnerable populations. Yet, a responsible opposition must propose alternative policy frameworks rather than resorting to sweeping denunciations.

If Afenifere’s leadership believes that returning to the old subsidy regime or multiple exchange rates is viable, they must articulate how those measures can be financed sustainably without plunging the nation back into fiscal crisis.

In the absence of credible policy alternatives, the faction’s screed reads less like constructive critique and more like a reflexive political strike.

10.2 The Long-Term Vision of the Renewed Hope Agenda

Central to Tinubu’s vision is the “Renewed Hope Agenda” – a multidimensional blueprint for economic diversification, security consolidation and social investment.

Within two years, Nigeria has reclaimed its status as Africa’s largest economy in nominal GDP – driven chiefly by non-oil growth, remittance inflows and a rebounding services sector.

The “Hope Cities” programme, still in its infancy, aspires to decongest megacities by creating satellite urban hubs. Likewise, agricultural mechanisation and a ₦200 billion loan facility for farmers signal an intent to reawaken the rural economy.

Though rubber-stamp critics deride these as pipe dreams, progress is demonstrable: agricultural yield in millet, sorghum and maize rose by 6 percent in 2024, helping to stabilise staple food prices by Q1 2025.

A sober assessment of policy efficacy must acknowledge both near-term costs and potential long-term dividends; zero-sum judgments satisfy partisan appetites but serve no one’s interests.

11. Towards Collaborative Nation-Building

The State House’s admonition against “fake news and deceptive AI videos” is apt; disinformation corrodes civic trust and exacerbates social fractures.

Rather than succumbing to binary tropes of “Tinubu good, Afenifere bad”, responsible citizens and political leaders must interrogate policy fundamentals and work collaboratively to refine them.

If subsidy removal inflicted undue pain, the administration should deepen social safety nets; if security gains in the North East remain fragile, restoring governance in reclaimed territories must be prioritised; if PHC revitalisation is uneven, local governments and community stakeholders must be empowered to drive change.

Politics should be a crucible of constructive contestation rather than a theatre of mutual demonisation. In this spirit, I invite Afenifere to step back from hyperbolic posturing and advance evidence-based proposals.

Only through candid, data-driven dialogue can Nigeria stride forward on the twin pillars of prosperity and stability.

Conclusion: Half-Full or Half-Empty?

Afenifere’s statement casts Nigeria’s glass as perpetually half-empty; it ignores demonstrable gains in foreign reserves, trade balances, credit ratings, security operations and human development indices. Yet, those achievements exist within an economy still reeling from structural underdevelopment and social fissures.

The correct posture is neither unbridled jubilation nor unrestrained despair, but rather calibrated optimism coupled with relentless scrutiny.

Under President Tinubu’s leadership, the prospects for genuine renewal are real, though far from guaranteed. The metrics— a \$6.83 billion balance of payments surplus, a 23.71 percent inflation rate held in check, over \$50 billion in FDI commitments, and 4,111 EFCC convictions—paint a picture of momentum.

If Afenifere truly seeks a stronger Nigeria, it must recognise that brickbats without blueprints achieve nothing. Instead of trading in deceit, the faction should marshal its considerable intellectual capital to propose viable policy options.

Nigeria’s “comeback story” is under way; those who aim to accelerate its course should rally behind constructive engagement, not irresponsible denunciation.

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