Nigeria’s airports are alarmingly exposed — not by accident but by a lethal cocktail of neglect, turf wars and half-baked “upgrades” that leave travellers and cargo alike vulnerable to catastrophic terror incidents.
An exclusive SaharaReporters dispatch today lays bare a chilling reality: Explosive Trace Detectors (ETDs), the simple, proven machines that sniff out microscopic residues of explosive compounds. are largely absent at local terminals across the country, and patrol vehicles for security teams are woefully scarce. If true, the consequences are grave.
The absence of ETDs at local airports is not a trivial equipment gap. ETDs (and their complements — explosive detection dogs and X-ray/CT scanners) form the backbone of contemporary airport screening regimes recommended by global authorities.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) explicitly endorses the random and systematic use of ETDs and similar technologies as part of layered security screening to detect explosives before they reach airside or cargo areas.
In plain terms: international best practice says you do not rely on luck when lives are at stake.
Nigeria’s regulatory framework on paper recognises those standards. The Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) mandates that aerodrome operators and authorised screening agents use explosive detection systems approved by the Authority when required by a security programme.
In other words, ETDs or equivalent devices are expected to be part of the toolkit.
The problem, according to industry sources, is implementation; the gulf between regulation on paper and reality on the ground.
Indeed, government agencies have been sending mixed signals. The Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) and some industry reports assert a programme of equipment replacement and the roll-out of “explosive detection devices” at major airports in recent months.
Yet aviation insiders told SaharaReporters that purported installations are either non-existent at local terminals or function at a fraction of their intended capacity (one Lagos unit assessed at “10 percent functional”).
This raises the ugly possibility of cosmetic or partial installs intended to appease oversight rather than to secure lives and commerce.
Worse still, the rollout has been marred by bureaucratic clashes that slow or sabotage security upgrades.
In March, a high-profile standoff at Lagos’ Murtala Muhammed International Airport reportedly saw customs officers detain FAAN security officials during an ETD installation — an episode that illustrates the inter-agency turf battles that can stall critical security projects.
When the agencies that are supposed to safeguard the airport fight each other, the passenger loses.
Why passengers should worry: cargo movements, which have long been the blind spot of many developing aviation systems, are singled out by sources as particularly dangerous.
Cargo flights can be used to move hazardous materials and concealable explosive components; without reliable screening at cargo sheds and freighter handling areas, the risk of an incident that could ground air services or cause mass casualties is real.
International airlines applying pressure to force limited installations at some cargo facilities only underlines how precarious Nigeria’s position is, and how dependent the country remains on outside scrutiny to meet minimum safety expectations.
Context matters: since 9/11 the global aviation sector has layered technology, procedures and intelligence to reduce the probability of explosives reaching aircraft or secure zones.
European and US regulators demand certified ETDs and performance testing; manufacturers and certification bodies publish criteria for detection thresholds, false-alarm rates and operational readiness.
Put bluntly, there are no credible shortcuts — the tools are known, the standards are known, and the absence of both is an invitation to disaster.
So where do we go from here? Immediate, verifiable actions are required:
FAAN, NCAA and the Ministry of Aviation must publish an audited, itemised inventory of ETDs, CT scanners and patrol assets deployed at every international, domestic and cargo terminal, and make maintenance records public.
Independent verification, ideally involving the ICAO or IATA auditors, should be invited to confirm operational readiness rather than rely on self-certification.
Inter-agency protocols must be enforced to prevent customs, police or other bodies from obstructing installations; criminal sanctions should follow deliberate obstruction that compromises public safety.
Prioritise cargo-screening upgrades: freighter sheds and cargo handlers must be treated as high-risk nodes, not afterthoughts.
The country’s aviation sector, which moves millions and underpins commerce, connectivity and national image, cannot afford a “cosmetic compliance” approach.
Nigerian travellers and international partners must insist on transparency and hard evidence that the machines exist, work and are used properly.
Until then, every boarding pass is a reminder of a system that still treats prevention as optional rather than essential.
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