Analysis, Business, Energy, Investigations

Dangote Refinery, Petrol Imports and Nigeria’s New Supply Reality

Despite Dangote refinery output, Nigeria imported about 15.01bn litres of petrol between Aug 2024 and Oct 10 2025, signalling a slow transition to domestic supply.

Atlantic Post

October 23, 2025

8–13 minutes

Dangote Refinery, Downstream Reform, Fuel Deregulation, Fuel Exports, market competition, Nigeria Energy, NMDPRA, Oil Industry Analysis, petrol imports, PMS Supply

Dangote Refinery Reshapes Nigeria Fuel Market but Imports Still Dominate the Mix

Nigeria is in the middle of a structural transition in downstream petroleum. Between August 2024 and 10 October 2025, the country imported roughly 15.01 billion litres of Premium Motor Spirit petrol.

This accounted for nearly 69 per cent of total supply in that 15-month window. This happened even though the Dangote refinery began supplying petrol to the market in September 2024.

The new refinery has altered supply dynamics. It injects an average of about 20 million litres per day into the domestic market. It also exports cargoes abroad, including to the United States and to regional buyers. Yet imports continued to supply the bulk of demand for most months during the review period.

The pattern is not a contradiction. It is a transitional profile where domestic capacity grows. Meanwhile, market arrangements, logistics and commercial incentives sustain imports.

The key questions now are how fast domestic refining can scale. Can policy and commercial frictions be resolved? How will pricing and competition decide whether Nigeria finally weans itself from import dependence?

The data in plain sight

The Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority published a dataset titled Import vs Domestic Supply Performance. It covers the PMS Daily Average Supply from August 2024 to October 2025. The dataset documented supply movements across 15 months.

Total PMS supply for the period stood at about 21.68 billion litres. Roughly 6.67 billion litres — approximately 31 per cent — originated from domestic refining. Imported petrol accounted for the remaining 15.01 billion litres, or nearly 69 per cent of the total.

Those numbers show an important fact. At the early stages of a large domestic refining presence, imports still remained the dominant source for the national pool.

Monthly averages in the dataset show a clear rhythm. Imported petrol averaged 44.60 million litres per day in August 2024 and rose to a peak around 54.30 million litres per day in September 2024, the month when Dangote began commercial petrol supply.

Imports then trended downwards as domestic output rose, falling to 24.15 million litres per day by January 2025 and to about 15.11 million litres per day in the first ten days of October 2025.

Domestic refining rose from effectively zero in August 2024 to a high daily average of about 22.66 million litres in January 2025 before stabilising around 18 to 20 million litres per day in later months.

Total daily supply also experienced volatility. A peak of 60.73 million litres per day occurred in September 2024 and then a general decline to about 34.04 million litres per day by early October 2025.

The pattern reflects shifts in import availability. It also reflects the ramp up, occasional maintenance, and operational management of the refinery complex.

Why imports stayed large while Dangote produced

At first glance, it seems irrational for Nigeria to continue importing nearly 69 percent of petrol. This is happening despite having a 650,000 barrels per day refinery working on home soil. The explanation is commercial and logistical rather than purely technical.

First, starting a refinery is not the same as instant substitution. The Dangote plant has a gargantuan nameplate capacity. Still, transforming operations into stable, calibrated flows of product for all domestic channels takes time.

Turnarounds and product quality adjustments impact product availability. Contractual commitments to export customers and commercial decisions about cargo placement also have an effect.

These factors decide how much product remains for domestic use on any given day. The refinery has also used imported crude at times to manage feedstock quality and schedules.

Second, markets respond to price signals. After full deregulation and the end of subsidy payments in September 2024, importers and marketers have continued to take part. Trading margins make importation commercially rational in many instances. Logistical relationships with ports and terminals strengthen this rationale. Additionally, pre-existing contracts also contribute to this commercial viability.

The refinery offered lower prices. As a result, some importers accused it of undercutting competitors by cutting prices. The refinery argued it has the capacity to sell into the market. It can also load any tanker that requests product.

Recent public statements by Dangote executives have highlighted large on-site inventories as an invitation to marketers to buy directly.

Third, exports complicate the picture. The refinery proved it is a supplier to international markets. It did so by shipping gasoline cargoes to the United States and by selling jet fuel to Saudi Aramco.

Those exports are legitimate commercial operations but they also mean that not all refined volumes are retained for domestic substitution. Export sales can be more profitable. Thus, the refinery will find it attractive to assign some volumes overseas. Meanwhile, domestic importers fill local gaps.

Exports, inventory and the new geometry of supply

The Dangote refinery has signalled it is not only servicing Nigeria but also global customers. Press reports and shipping data show gasoline cargoes destined for the United States in September 2025. They also report jet fuel sales to Saudi Aramco earlier in 2025.

Those sales are milestones for an African refinery and a nod to the plant’s export ability. But exports have a domestic trade off. Every cargo sold abroad is a tonne of product not available for substitution at home unless production is expanded further.

At the same time the refinery has claimed large tank inventories. In mid-October 2025, company executives said the plant had over 310 million litres of petrol ready for loading. They invited marketers to come with tankers.

That public posture is part technical briefing. It also serves as commercial signaling. The goal is to calm concerns about local availability. Additionally, it nudges marketers to buy locally.

Observers should treat the inventory figure as material. They should also check whether that inventory is already committed to contracts or export programmes.

Price competition and commercial friction

The arrival of a large domestic supplier disrupted market pricing. Importers complained about Dangote’s price cuts. They described these cuts as anti-competitive. Meanwhile, the refinery suggested that competitive pricing is a normal commercial response.

The net effect is a more contested market where price, credit terms and distribution relationships decide who supplies whom. That competition is healthy for end consumers in principle. But, it also creates volatility. This volatility can raise short term supply and pricing risks.

Regulators and the market will need to reconcile fair competition with orderly supply management. Several industry actors continue to air grievances even as supply metrics show imports declining month on month.

The policy backdrop

The Federal Government completely deregulated petrol in September 2024. This action removed the subsidy regime that had shaped import economics for decades. With deregulation, the economics of importation and refining became more transparent and market driven.

The removal of the subsidy altered the affordability of imports. It also influenced who was incentivized to sell domestically rather than export. Deregulation also elevated the role of the NMDPRA as the authority tracking flows and mediating disputes between marketers and refiners.

That reform is a structural pivot. For observers, important follow-up questions include whether infrastructure for inland distribution can scale to match refinery output. Another question is whether ports and terminals can handle the different pattern of product flow. Additionally, observers wonder whether state institutions will oversee product quality and commercial fairness.

Absent those supporting adjustments, the refinery’s nominal capacity will not automatically translate into sustained disappearance of imports.

Consumption trends and demand compression

The data shows an overall fall in average daily petrol consumption from the 60.73 million litres per day peak in September 2024 to a lower run rate of about 34.04 million litres per day by October 2025. Several drivers explain the decline.

One is genuine demand contraction after the end of subsidy when pump prices rose and consumers adjusted behaviour. Another is data and logistical smoothing where stocks in transit, inventory timing and reporting methodologies affect obvious daily averages.

Finally, structural substitution can reduce short term petrol demand. Examples include improved public transport, altered commuting patterns, and economic slowdowns in some sectors.

There is a drop in measured daily demand. This drop relieves some pressure on domestic refineries to replace imports instantly. Nevertheless, it also raises questions about long-term demand growth. These questions concern pricing elasticity as well.

Historical comparison and significance

For decades Nigeria exported crude and imported refined products. The country’s post-colonial downstream architecture allowed refining capacity to decline and imports to dominate. The arrival of a 650,000 bpd refinery thus signifies a generational shift.

Even so, history counsels patience. Large refineries elsewhere have taken years to stabilise throughput, commercial allocation and domestic supply linkages.

The current episode is remarkable due to the rapid pace of commercial integration. A privately owned domestic refinery is at the same time supplying local markets. It is also winning export contracts.

That dual role was rarely possible for Nigerian refineries in the past given state ownership, underinvestment and maintenance failures. The Dangote complex is thereby rewriting expectations but not erasing structural constraints overnight.

Risks, red flags and recommendations

The transition carries several risks.

• Export bias risk. If more product is exported than retained for domestic substitution, the country will stay vulnerable to import cycles. This vulnerability occurs when refinery operations dip. Regulators should watch and publish export-to-domestic allocation ratios.

• Concentration risk. Heavy reliance on a single large refinery concentrates operational risk. Contingency strategies and transparent schedules for maintenance and turnarounds are essential.

• Market fairness risk. Accusations of anti-competitive pricing must be investigated quickly but fairly by the regulator and by competition authorities if necessary. Clear rules on ganglia sales, rebates and below-cost pricing would calm the market.

• Logistics bottlenecks. Inland distribution networks and depot capacity will need investment to absorb larger domestic product flows. Public-private coordination on terminal access and pipeline upgrading is urgent.

Recommendations for policymakers and market actors

1. The NMDPRA should publish regular, detailed allocation data showing domestic retention versus exports for major refineries to improve transparency.

2. The Federal Government should facilitate credit lines. It can also offer short-term liquidity arrangements. This support can help marketers buy local product instead of defaulting to imports when working capital is tight.

3. The Dangote Group should create a public schedule of available domestic volumes. They should also list any export commitments to reduce market confusion.

4. Competition authorities should oversee pricing behaviour and resolve disputes rapidly with clear published findings to avoid politicisation.

5. Investment in inland logistics and terminal access should be prioritised to translate refinery throughput into nationwide supply.

What this means for Nigerians

In practical terms, consumers see more price flexibility. But, there is not yet a definitive fall in pump prices as imports are disappearing. The refinery’s presence is a structural improvement but the transition will be messy.

For households and businesses, the relevant short-term variables remain retail pricing. Another factor is the availability at local filling stations. Additionally, it’s important for marketers to secure credit to buy products locally.

For the state, the central task is to translate a refinery success story into distributive outcomes. These outcomes should reduce foreign exchange pressure. They should also stabilise domestic supply and create predictable industrial linkages.

The import figure of about 15.01 billion litres in 15 months is not an indictment of the refinery. Instead, it indicates the current status of the Nigerian petroleum value chain in October 2025. This status is in the middle of a complex evolution.

Final thoughts

The Dangote refinery has demonstrably changed Nigeria’s downstream landscape. It supplies on average around 20 million litres per day to the domestic market. It also has proven export ability with confirmed shipments to the United States.

Additionally, it makes jet fuel sales to major global buyers. Yet the transition from an import dependent nation to a largely self-supplying country will take time.

The 15.01 billion litres of imported petrol were recorded between August 2024 and 10 October 2025. These figures show that commercial patterns shape supply. Logistics and export decisions continue to play a role in shaping supply.

Policymakers and industry actors must now focus on transparency. They should guarantee competition oversight. Logistics investments are also crucial. These efforts will help domestic refining translate into sustained energy security for Nigerians.