Defence, Investigations, National Security, Nigeria

State of Emergency or Bandage Politics: Nigeria at War With Boko Haram

Retired generals and elders demand a legislated state of emergency as Boko Haram overruns towns and 5,000 flee to Cameroon. Why politics must yield to strategy.

Atlantic Post

October 6, 2025

10–15 minutes

Boko Haram, Borno, Internal Displacement, Kirawa, Lucky Irabor, military reform, National Security, Northern Elders Forum, State of Emergency, Tinubu

State of Emergency or Bandage Politics: The Case for a National Reckoning on Boko Haram

For years Nigerians have been told that the insurgency in the north east is being degraded. For weeks the public has watched towns emptied and military outposts burned. Now retired commanders, who once oversaw the same campaigns, are stating a hard truth. They critique the campaigns now. In a newly published book, General Lucky Irabor (retd) argues that what is missing is political will backed by law. He asserts the need for a genuine, legislated state of emergency. This emergency would align the instruments of national power behind victory. Several retired generals have echoed that call.

General Nduka Irabor (retd), former Chief of Defence Staff of Nigeria.

Meanwhile, Boko Haram fighters have overrun the border town of Kirawa. They have burnt homes and a military barracks. This has forced more than 5,000 people into neighbouring Cameroon. The humanitarian toll is steep and the security debate has hardened into a binary choice. Act decisively now, or watch the violence metastasise.

The flashpoint Kirawa and a failing perimeter

On the night the insurgents entered Kirawa they did what insurgents have done for 16 years. They struck fast, hit installations, terrorised civilians and withdrew only when they had done the strategic damage they sought. Eyewitness reports and independent international dispatches describe the burning of the district head’s palace. They also describe the destruction of a military barracks. Dozens of homes were razed. The population was forced into a chaotic exodus across the border into Cameroon. Reuters and other agencies put the flight at over 5,000 people in a single operation. The image of an emptied town is at once a humanitarian emergency and an indictment of perimeter security.

Kirawa is more than an isolated tragedy. Border towns like Kirawa are strategic nodes. They are transit points for fighters and supplies. These towns host daily markets for vulnerable civilians. For security forces, they offer both exposure and serve as an indicator. When a town within sight of international borders falls, it shows weaknesses at many levels. These include intelligence gaps, thin troop presence, fragile civil defence structures, and porous arms channels. The result is not merely local displacement but a regional shock. The refugees who cross into Cameroon carry memories, trauma and a new strain on already stretched host communities.

Retired generals say what active commanders can’t

General Irabor’s new book, Scars: Nigeria’s Journey and the Boko Haram Conundrum, has reignited a debate. This debate is one the nation has been avoiding. It concerns the role of political leadership in a long running war. Irabor does not couch his view in purely technical terms. He argues that strategy is the sum of national power. This includes economic, political, social, diplomatic, information, and military elements. Without political authority aligning these instruments, tactical success is hollow. His thesis is sharp. Tactical gains do not translate into strategic victory if political will is absent. That is the central grievance he lays at the door of successive administrations.

That argument has found resonance among retired senior officers. Brigadier General Peter Aro (retd) told journalists that a state of emergency should be properly declared. It should also be legislatively backed. This would give coherence and urgency. He warned against cosmetic versions of emergency powers that leave local governance untouched.

Retired Major General Dayo Olukoju and Col. Saka Folusho (retd) offered qualified support. They argued that the emergency must be accompanied by a multilateral approach. This approach should tackle root causes. It must also stop the illicit trade in arms. Those endorsements matter because they shift the narrative from partisan rhetoric to operational prescription.

What a genuine state of emergency would mean

A state of emergency in the Nigerian context is not a slogan. If properly conceived and legislated it would do several things.

1. Consolidate command and control. It would clarify chains of authority and reduce paralysing political interference at operational junctions. As Brig Gen Aro put it, when politics steps aside security can take full command and coordination improves. That does not mean martial law. It means statutory instruments that empower commanders while preserving constitutional safeguards.

2. Mobilise national instruments of power. An emergency would allow the executive and legislature to work together. They can coordinate economic levers, emergency relief, and international partnerships. This coordinated approach is more effective than patchwork ad hoc responses. Irabor is explicit that strategy is the aggregate of these instruments. Without economic and diplomatic alignment the military’s gains are temporary.

3. Prioritise logistics and equipment. Officers who have seen the front lines repeatedly note that logistics and arms posture are decisive. Col. Saka Folusho warned of illicit arms trade and chronic underpaying of soldiers. A genuine emergency would mandate procurement, sustainment and personnel welfare as matters of national security urgency.

4. Allow population protection and relief. Emergency arrangements should guarantee coordination and proper resourcing. This is essential for humanitarian corridors, rescue operations, and temporary shelter. These measures are necessary to avoid a secondary catastrophe. The Kirawa exodus shows how quickly a security incident becomes a full blown humanitarian crisis.

A state of emergency is not a silver bullet. It is a tool. Its effect depends on honest design, legislative oversight and political courage.

Root causes, multilateral approaches and the limits of force

Retired Major General Dayo Olukoju’s caution about root causes is not a plea for softness. It is a reminder that insurgency is bred in a mixture of grievance, identity fractures and criminal economies. Any campaign that ignores social and political dimensions risks creating recurring violence. Olukoju stressed elite, traditional and spiritual leaders must be part of the response. That is a necessary complement to a security first posture.

This is not novel. Comparative history shows that purely kinetic campaigns produce temporary tactical victories but can entrench cycles of revenge and radicalisation. The British campaigns in Malaya illustrate the point. The U.S. campaigns in the Philippines also show this. More recently, the multilateral approach in Colombia has underscored the same issue.

Successful campaigns combine credible security, sustained governance, economic reintegration and truth telling. Where politics is impatient, insurgency regenerates. This is the trap Irabor warns against.

Arms, illicit trade and the new asymmetry

Col. Saka Folusho’s intervention on illicit arms strikes at the heart of the asymmetry that presently favours the insurgents in pockets. Insurgents can source weapons and ammunition. They move freely across borders and leverage smuggling networks. Thus, the state’s monopoly of force is undermined.

International instruments and domestic enforcement have been patchy. Nigeria is part of regional frameworks to control illicit SALW but enforcement gaps persist. A declared emergency requires a crackdown on the supply chains that feed the violence. It also needs improved tracing and interdiction capacity.

Recent moves by the Nigerian Army to boost local production and maintenance are welcome. Nevertheless, production alone without secure procurement channels will risk another theatre of corruption. Transparent oversight is necessary. Procurement is a political problem as much as it is technical. A state of emergency that centralises procurement without oversight risks repeating past errors. That is why legislative backing and clear accountability are indispensable.

The human cost

The cold arithmetic of casualty statistics obscures the human detail. There are already more than two million people displaced in the north east. They also exist in related conflict zones, living in camps and informal settlements. They face food insecurity, interrupted schooling and acute mental health trauma. International humanitarian agencies have repeatedly raised alarms about the scale of need in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe.

The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates displacement figures in the millions. UN clusters warn that these displacements are not temporary. They create new vulnerabilities that insurgents exploit. The Kirawa flight is the most recent surge, but it arrives on top of an existing catastrophe.

This is not just a numeric burden on aid agencies. It is the destruction of livelihoods, the severing of community networks and the long term scarring of a generation. When 5,000 walk across a border overnight, they carry with them trauma. They also carry lost documents. They have a palpable distrust of the state that neglected to protect them. Unless responses are rapid and accountable, displacement becomes permanent exile.

Politics, blame and the culpability of complacency

The security debate has predictably split along party lines. The Northern Elders Forum has been vociferous in demanding a state of emergency in the north. The Forum describes the crisis as both national and exceptional. It calls for the massive deployment of security agencies.

There is also a call for heavy policing in zones deemed crisis prone. That demand raises legitimate questions about the balance between militarised security and civil rights. But the NEF’s demand also underlines a truth often omitted from elite debates. The people who live under the threat of daily violence want decisive action. They do not want rhetorical reassurance.

Political parties will always spin. The African Democratic Congress has accused the president of insensitivity. They argue that frequent social outings by the president amid escalating attacks amount to neglect. The ruling party retorted that arrests and intelligence successes show progress. This blame game helps no one. What matters is whether the instruments of state power are being used coherently and honestly to protect citizens. The continuous public spectacle of denial and spin erodes trust and fuels the permissive environment where insurgents grow.

Legal architecture and the need for legislative oversight

A state of emergency must be legislated and time bound. That is non negotiable. History warns of open ended emergencies that become vehicles for abuse. The right design is a package. It includes a clear mandate for the security architecture and defined geographic scope. It also involves sunset clauses, an independent oversight mechanism, and parliamentary scrutiny. Ignoring those elements would turn a legitimate security tool into a licence for impunity. General Irabor is blunt about this. Military success without political clarity is wasted. The legislature must be a partner not a rubber stamp.

Legislative backing also gives democratic cover to difficult choices. If emergency logistics need rapid procurement, the law can define transparent procurement paths and special audit provisions. If borders must be temporarily reconfigured for security, the law can set strict conditions, timelines and remedial measures. Legislating the emergency prevents half measures and prevents the arbitrary use of force. That is the single biggest lesson from other countries that have both won and lost protracted conflicts.

Practical steps for an emergency that can work

If the Federal Government accepts the argument for a legislated emergency, the design should follow three concrete pillars.

1. Operational clarity and resource surge. Immediate deployment of trained units to key border towns, accelerated logistics, and dedicated funding lines for sustainment and intelligence. Troops must be adequately equipped and paid. The focus must be on creating secure zones that allow humanitarian operations to continue.

2. Integrated civil security and community protection. Enhanced policing initiatives can be implemented. Properly designed state policing pilots can be conducted where constitutionally permissible. Community protection programmes should be established. It’s also important to rapidly repair basic services so civilians can return. A Member of the House spoke on state police and Friday police experiments in the 1960s. This highlights the potential value of localised, accountable security cadres. This is possible if they are properly legislated. Community nomination, transparent recruitment and local deployment reduce malfeasance.

3. Cut the supply lines and follow the money. A coordinated drive to interdict arms flows, trace transactions and prosecute syndicates. This requires regional diplomacy to close porous borders and international partnerships to stem supply chains. Parallel financial investigations must target trafficking routes and the profiteers who allow violence.

Risks and the way to mitigate them

A state of emergency carries risks of politicisation, human rights abuse and mission creep. Those risks are real. These risks can be mitigated by a clear sunset clause. Independent monitoring, both domestic and international, is also important. There should be a parliamentary review at defined intervals. Judicial recourse for abuses should be available. Additionally, the emergency must be paired from day one with a robust communications plan. This plan should explain objectives and safeguards to the public. This will guarantee fear of abuse does not overshadow the effort.

What success must look like

Success can’t be defined wholly by numbers of killed insurgents. It must be measured by restored freedom of movement. Success should also be gauged by the reopening of schools. Additionally, it requires the safe return of displaced populations under conditions of dignity. Finally, success includes the reestablishment of governance and markets. Tactical victories are necessary but not enough. The overarching metric must be measurable improvement in civilian safety. Authority must be progressively handed back to accountable civilian structures. That is how wars become peace.

Conclusion: Urgent but accountable action

General Lucky Irabor’s book has done the country a service. It clarifies what many field commanders have long privately suspected. The limits of the military response are political. Retired generals are increasingly public about what they think should happen now. The seizure of Kirawa shows that the current approach is failing. The flight of thousands into Cameroon also provides immediate evidence. An extraordinary response is demanded.

The question for President Bola Tinubu and the National Assembly is whether they will create a legislated, accountable emergency instrument. They must mobilise every element of state power. Then they need to govern it transparently. Otherwise the cycle will continue, displacement will grow, and the state’s claim to protect its citizens will be hollow.

The cost of delay is measured in burned homes, orphaned children and towns emptied of life. This is the time for clarity, courage and co-ordinated action not platitudes.