Nigeria’s State Police proposal has crossed the constitutional approval threshold, with at least 32 state assemblies reported to have endorsed the amendment. But unresolved voting records, unfinished implementation laws and concerns about political interference raise a bigger question: who will police those entrusted with policing the states?
Nigeria is edging towards one of the most significant changes to its security architecture since the return to democratic government in 1999.
President Bola Tinubu could receive the proposed State Police constitutional amendment for assent on or before Friday, November 20, following confirmation that the National Assembly has secured the minimum number of state approvals required under the Constitution.
Senate Leader Opeyemi Bamidele says at least 32 of Nigeria’s 36 State Houses of Assembly have approved the proposed Constitution (Sixth Alteration) Bill, 2026.
Other parliamentary sources cited in recent reports put the figure as high as 34.
Either figure would comfortably exceed the constitutional requirement of 24 states.
Yet the apparent breakthrough raises questions that go beyond the number of legislative votes.
Nigeria is considering transferring significant policing responsibilities from a centralised federal institution to governments that will have direct political, financial and administrative interests in the new services.
The promise is improved local intelligence, faster emergency responses and policing that understands the communities it serves.
The danger is that state police could also become a formidable instrument of executive power if the institutions responsible for supervising them are not genuinely independent.
The central question is no longer simply whether Nigeria should establish state police.
It is whether the country can build a policing system that protects citizens without making their safety dependent on the political interests of their governors.
The 24-State Threshold Has Been Crossed
The constitutional amendment process has advanced considerably since the National Assembly transmitted the State Police proposal to the 36 state legislatures on September 16, 2026.
Under Section 9(2) of the 1999 Constitution, a constitutional alteration requires approval by at least two-thirds of the members of each chamber of the National Assembly and resolutions supporting the amendment from at least two-thirds of the 36 State Houses of Assembly.
That translates to 24 states.
The Senate and House of Representatives have completed their respective approval processes, while state legislatures have continued forwarding their decisions to the National Assembly.
On November 3, the Clerk to the National Assembly, Kamoru Ogunlana, confirmed that 28 state assemblies had submitted authenticated approvals.
The following day, the Senate reported that the figure had reached 30.
On November 15, Bamidele announced that at least 32 assemblies had approved the amendment.
He said:
“As shown in the records of the National Assembly, no fewer than 32 state Houses of Assembly have approved the State Police (Constitution Alteration) Bill, 2026. With this, we have successfully crossed the constitutional threshold under Section 9(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).”
The Senate Leader said four outstanding state assemblies were expected to submit their reports before the National Assembly reconvened on November 17.
He added:
“Whether the remaining states turn in their reports or not, we must move forward and fulfil the aspiration of our people.”
Bamidele also confirmed that the National Assembly intended to transmit the bill to Tinubu for assent.
He described the next step as a responsibility lawmakers must discharge in the interest of national peace, progress and stability.
The Cross River Discrepancy Raises Questions About the Official Records
An important detail in the latest reporting deserves closer attention.
Although parliamentary reports have continued to identify Cross River among states with outstanding submissions, the Cross River State House of Assembly publicly announced on October 20 that it had passed the proposed constitutional amendment.
According to the state government’s account, 22 of the Assembly’s 25 lawmakers voted in favour, with three members absent.
Speaker Elvert Ayambem described the decision as support for the constitutional framework establishing State Police Services.
Deputy House Leader Davies Eta also emphasised the need for adequate safeguards, accountability and professionalism.
The discrepancy illustrates why it is important to distinguish between an assembly passing a proposal and the National Assembly receiving and authenticating the official record of that decision.
The two processes are not necessarily the same.
In its November 12 assessment, the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) identified Cross River among six states whose positions were still outstanding in the formal reporting process.
The six were Abia, Benue, Cross River, Kano, Niger and Oyo.
By November 15, Bamidele said four state assemblies were still expected to submit their reports but did not identify them.
Consequently, the available public information does not establish a definitive list of the four outstanding states.
There is also a discrepancy between Bamidele’s figure of 32 approvals and the 34 reported by unnamed parliamentary sources cited by The PUNCH.
These developments do not necessarily invalidate the amendment process. Additional resolutions may have reached the National Assembly between successive announcements.
But a constitutional reform of this magnitude deserves an accessible, consolidated record showing which states approved the bill, when they voted and when their authenticated decisions reached Abuja.
The threshold has been crossed. Transparency should now be the priority.
What the Proposed Amendment Would Actually Change
Nigeria’s existing constitutional framework provides for a single Nigeria Police Force under federal control.
The proposed amendment would replace that arrangement with two policing institutions: a Federal Police Service and State Police Services.
Under the proposed structure, the Federal Police Service would retain responsibility for federal policing functions, including national security, terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime, international and interstate offences, border security and the protection of federal institutions.
State Police Services would concentrate on maintaining public order, enforcing state laws, protecting lives and property and addressing crimes within their respective jurisdictions.
The arrangement is intended to bring policing closer to communities and reduce the operational limitations associated with a single national command structure.
But the constitutional amendment is an enabling measure, not an instruction for all 36 states to immediately establish their own police forces.
The proposed provisions make it clear that a State Police Service cannot begin operational policing until it has been established through a law passed by its State House of Assembly and certified as meeting national minimum standards.
The Federal Police Service would continue performing policing functions in states that had not yet established operational state services.
This creates a phased transition rather than an immediate nationwide replacement of the existing police structure.
Can Governors Be Prevented From Abusing State Police?
This is arguably the most consequential question surrounding the reform.
State governors already exercise considerable influence over security matters within their jurisdictions.
Giving them greater authority over police operations could improve coordination and responsiveness.
But without enforceable safeguards, the same authority could expose opposition politicians, journalists, protesters, civil society organisations and other critics to politically motivated policing.
Nigeria’s political history makes these concerns important to consider.
An institution designed to protect citizens must not become an extension of the government of the day.
The proposed constitutional amendment attempts to address the problem through restrictions on executive directives, appointment procedures, independent commissions and exceptional federal intervention.
Under the proposed provisions, a State Police Service would be headed by a Commander of Police appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the National Police Council and subject to confirmation by the State House of Assembly.
The governor would be permitted to issue lawful written directives on general policing policy.
But the proposed Section 215 specifically prohibits such directives from requiring arrests, detention, investigations or the use of force against named individuals, political parties or associations outside the law.
It also prohibits directives designed to suppress lawful political activity, discriminate against groups or advance partisan, ethnic, religious or personal interests.
The proposed framework provides that a State Police Commander cannot be suspended or removed except for stated cause, following a fair hearing and recommendation by the National Police Council, with approval from at least two-thirds of the State House of Assembly.
A State Police Service Commission would also be established with responsibilities for appointments, discipline, oversight, complaints and accountability.
These are important constitutional safeguards.
However, their effectiveness will depend on the independence of the institutions responsible for enforcing them.
An oversight commission that cannot investigate governors, senior police officers or politically sensitive misconduct without interference would offer limited protection.
The composition, appointment procedures, funding and investigative powers of these commissions will therefore be critical issues for the implementing legislation.
Federal Intervention: A Necessary Safeguard or Another Political Risk?
The proposed amendment also provides for exceptional federal intervention where a state police service becomes incapable of maintaining public safety or is used for serious abuses.
The grounds include an actual or imminent breakdown of public order, serious administrative or operational incapacity, threats to national security and substantial evidence of systematic human rights violations or partisan and electoral intimidation.
The proposed provisions require federal intervention to be temporary, necessary and proportionate.
The President would have to authorise the intervention in writing, with notification to the affected governor, State House of Assembly, National Police Council and National Assembly within 48 hours.
The legality and duration of such intervention would also be subject to judicial review.
These provisions recognise that decentralisation must not leave the country without a mechanism for responding to a state security crisis.
Nevertheless, the implementing legislation must define the evidence, procedures and oversight mechanisms required before federal intervention can occur.
Otherwise, the power intended to prevent abuses could itself become another source of political tension between federal and state authorities.
The National Policing Bill Is the Next Major Hurdle
Even if Tinubu receives the constitutional amendment this week, operational State Police Services will still require substantial legislative and administrative work.
The Presidential Working Group on the National Policing Bill, chaired by the President’s Chief of Staff, Femi Gbajabiamila, announced on October 20 that it had submitted the draft National Policing Bill, 2026, alongside 29 consequential amendment bills to the Federal Ministry of Justice.
The submission was made on October 19 for legislative drafting review and validation.
The Ministry was expected to return the documents by October 30, after which the working group intended to present the validated package to the President before its transmission to the National Assembly.
The National Policing Bill is intended to establish the operational framework for the proposed dual policing structure.
It will address national minimum standards, certification, recruitment, training, oversight, complaints, firearms control, intelligence sharing, intergovernmental cooperation and accountability.
In its November 12 assessment, PLAC noted that the government’s announcement of a review timetable did not establish that the implementing bills had reached the National Assembly.
The distinction is important.
The constitutional amendment creates the legal foundation for state policing. The National Policing Bill and its consequential amendments must establish how the system will work.
Individual states must also enact their own legislation and demonstrate that they are institutionally ready to operate a police service.
Until these requirements are satisfied, constitutional approval alone cannot authorise the deployment of new State Police officers.
The Financial Cost Could Test State Governments
Another challenge is whether state governments can sustainably finance professional police institutions.
Establishing a police service involves considerably more than recruiting officers and purchasing patrol vehicles.
States will need dependable funding for salaries, pensions, training, intelligence gathering, forensic investigations, communications equipment, surveillance technology, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, detention facilities and internal disciplinary systems.
They will also need independent complaints mechanisms capable of investigating allegations of extortion, unlawful detention, excessive force and political interference.
These responsibilities will compete with existing demands on state budgets, including healthcare, education, infrastructure and social welfare.
The ability of a state to establish a police service should therefore be measured by its capacity to maintain professional standards over time, not merely by its willingness to announce a recruitment exercise.
PLAC has called for costed implementation plans, transparent funding arrangements, independent oversight and clearly defined certification requirements.
It has also warned that the credibility of the reform will depend on safeguards that citizens can actually enforce.
State Police Before the 2027 Elections?
The timing of the reform has additional significance because Nigeria is approaching another general election cycle.
With the proposed amendment still requiring completion of the constitutional and legislative processes, the establishment and certification of operational state police services before the January 2027 elections appears highly unlikely.
PLAC has made the same practical assessment, while stressing that this is not a legal deadline.
Existing lawful security arrangements will therefore remain responsible for election security unless the necessary legislative and institutional requirements are completed.
This is particularly important because state police must not become a shortcut for political mobilisation, intimidation or unequal enforcement of the law.
The proposed framework must work for opposition parties and governing parties alike.
It must also protect journalists, election observers, protesters and ordinary citizens from politically motivated arrests or surveillance.
The Real Measure of Success
Nigeria’s movement towards State Police represents a significant proposed change to the country’s approach to internal security.
Its supporters argue that local policing could improve intelligence, response times and community confidence.
Critics remain concerned about political interference, uneven institutional capacity and the possibility that powerful governors could exploit local security structures.
Both questions deserve serious consideration.
The National Assembly has secured the minimum number of state approvals required to move the constitutional alteration process forward. Bamidele says the remaining reports will not prevent the legislature from proceeding.
But the quality of the final reform will not be determined by how quickly the bill reaches the Presidency.
It will be determined by the strength of the laws, the independence of oversight institutions, the transparency of funding and the ability of citizens to obtain justice when police powers are abused.
A police officer who is closer to a community is not automatically more accountable to its people.
The danger of centralised policing cannot be resolved simply by transferring authority to 36 state governments.
Nigeria must ensure that decentralising police command does not decentralise impunity.
The country needs police services capable of protecting communities without serving political masters.
That is the test that will determine whether State Police becomes a genuine security reform or another powerful institution that Nigerians must learn to fear.




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