Atlantic Post

Fresh state assembly approvals have revived Nigeria’s push to establish state police. But conflicting tallies, unresolved questions about political interference and the challenge of funding 36 policing systems raise a fundamental question: will decentralisation make Nigerians safer, or merely move the power to abuse the police closer to home?

The reform is advancing. The accountability test is just beginning.

Nigeria’s state police proposal has gained fresh momentum, with several State Houses of Assembly backing constitutional changes designed to dismantle the country’s long-standing monopoly on policing at the federal level.

Ogun, Delta, Plateau and Kwara are among the states reported to have approved the proposed constitutional alteration. Adamawa also reported passing 24 of 26 clauses, while rejecting two provisions its lawmakers considered insufficiently clear.

The Presidential Working Group on the National Policing Bill has also completed a major stage of its assignment, submitting a draft National Policing Bill, 2026, and 29 consequential amendment bills to the Federal Ministry of Justice for legislative drafting review and validation.

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Yet the most important question is no longer whether state policing enjoys political support. It is whether Nigeria can create a decentralised security system that responds more quickly to citizens without allowing governors, political parties or other powerful interests to turn police officers into instruments of control.

That question carries particular weight as the country approaches another election cycle and communities continue to face threats from kidnapping, banditry, terrorism, communal violence and other serious crimes.

State police could help close gaps in intelligence gathering and emergency response. It could also create new vulnerabilities if recruitment, command structures, funding and investigations into police misconduct are left exposed to political pressure.

The amendment’s passage through the National Assembly is a significant development. It is not, by itself, evidence that the proposed system will be effective, adequately funded or safe from abuse.

A dispute over the number of approving states

The latest reports reveal a discrepancy that deserves attention.

The Guardian reported on 21 October that 13 State Houses of Assembly had backed the constitutional amendment. Its account listed eight recent approvals from Kwara, Nasarawa, Ogun, Delta, Taraba, Cross River, Plateau and Enugu, alongside earlier approvals from Edo, Osun, Oyo, Rivers and Zamfara.

The PUNCH, reporting on the same day, listed 10 states, counting Ogun, Delta, Plateau, Kwara and Adamawa alongside the five previously reported approvals.

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The discrepancy matters because Section 9(2) of the 1999 Constitution requires approval by at least two-thirds of the 36 State Houses of Assembly for a constitutional alteration of this kind. That means at least 24 states must approve the proposal.

If the tally is 13, another 11 approvals are required. If the tally is 10, another 14 are needed.

The difference is not evidence, on its own, that either newspaper’s account is false. The reports may be relying on different definitions of approval, different reporting cut-off times or different stages of communicating resolutions to the National Assembly.

Adamawa’s position makes verification especially important. Its lawmakers reportedly passed 24 of 26 clauses and rejected two because members considered them unclear. That raises a practical question: how has the state’s formal resolution been recorded, and does it count as approval of the constitutional alteration in its entirety?

A clear, consolidated register from the National Assembly would settle the issue. It should identify each state, the date of its resolution, the precise version approved and whether the resolution has been formally received.

Until those details are reconciled, claims about the exact number of states backing the amendment should be treated with caution.

The constitutional threshold is not an administrative footnote. It determines whether the reform can advance through the process prescribed by the Constitution.

Two bills, two different stages

A second issue concerns the distinction between the constitutional amendment and the proposed National Policing Bill.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Sixth Alteration) Bill, 2026, was transmitted to the 36 State Houses of Assembly on 16 September after being passed by the Senate on 24 June and the House of Representatives on 23 July, according to The Guardian.

The state legislatures are being asked to approve the constitutional changes that would permit a dual policing arrangement comprising a Federal Police Service and State Police Services.

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The National Policing Bill is a separate legislative track intended to provide the wider statutory framework for operating that arrangement.

In a statement issued on 20 October, Femi Gbajabiamila, the President’s Chief of Staff and chairman of the Presidential Working Group, said the draft National Policing Bill and 29 consequential amendment bills had been submitted to the Ministry of Justice on 19 October.

The ministry is expected to return the validated drafts to the working group on or before Friday, 30 October. The group will then give the documents final consideration before presenting them to President Bola Tinubu, according to the statement.

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Gbajabiamila described the exercise as a process intended to produce a “rigorous and transparent process” for developing a comprehensive legislative proposal. He also said the ministry’s review would ensure that the bills conform to legislative drafting standards and do not conflict with existing laws.

These are important steps. But legal drafting review is not the same as public accountability.

The public needs to know what the final draft proposes, which institutions will control state police services, how they will be funded, and which bodies will investigate alleged misconduct by officers operating under state authority.

The executive statement also says consideration of the constitutional amendment by the states must be completed before the National Policing Bill is transmitted to the National Assembly. Because the constitutional amendment has already passed both national chambers and is undergoing state consideration, official communications should clearly distinguish the two tracks and explain the sequence for each.

Without that clarity, citizens may struggle to tell the difference between approval of the constitutional principle and the subsequent legislation needed to implement it.

The history behind the fear of state police

Nigeria has travelled this road before.

At independence in 1960, the country operated a system in which the federal police coexisted with local police structures controlled by regional or local authorities. That arrangement was dismantled after the military coups of 1966 amid allegations that regional authorities had used local police against political opponents. By 1972, the local forces had been fully integrated into the Nigeria Police Force.

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That history should not be used to dismiss every argument for decentralisation. It should, however, prevent lawmakers from treating the transfer of policing powers as an uncomplicated administrative reform.

The proposed system would place more responsibility for local security closer to state governments. In principle, that could give police services a better understanding of local languages, terrain, community disputes and the movements of criminal groups.

But closer proximity to a community is not the same as independence from its political leadership.

A police officer who understands a community’s security challenges may be better positioned to detect threats. The same officer, if subject to improper political pressure, may also be placed in a position to intimidate residents, harass critics or selectively enforce the law.

The risks are not hypothetical in the broader history of Nigerian policing. Human Rights Watch’s 2010 report, Everyone’s in on the Game, documented allegations of extortion, unlawful detention, corruption and inadequate accountability within the federal police system. The report also described weaknesses in mechanisms for investigating misconduct.

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The lesson cuts both ways. Centralisation has not guaranteed professional, accountable policing. But decentralisation will not automatically deliver it either.

The real test is whether the reform creates institutions capable of restraining political power, enforcing professional standards and protecting citizens wherever they live.

Can governors be prevented from weaponising the police?

The most sensitive feature of the proposed system is the relationship between state governors and the police commanders expected to serve under them.

The version of the constitutional amendment approved by the Senate in June was presented as containing safeguards against the partisan, ethnic, religious, sectional or personal misuse of state police.

Senate Leader Opeyemi Bamidele said the proposed framework would empower the National Assembly to establish national minimum standards covering recruitment, training, vetting, promotions, discipline, use of force, firearms, complaints procedures, accountability and professional conduct.

He also said federal intervention could be permitted in specified circumstances, including a breakdown of public order, serious violations of fundamental rights, electoral intimidation and threats to national security. Such intervention, he said, would require written presidential authorisation, be limited in scope and duration, remain subject to Senate oversight and be open to judicial review.

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These provisions matter because state police must serve the public rather than the administration that controls the state government.

A system in which governors can influence police appointments, deployments and budgets without effective checks could expose opposition politicians, protesters, journalists and ordinary residents to pressure from authorities they may have little practical ability to challenge.

The question is not whether governors should have any role in policing. A decentralised system necessarily requires a defined relationship between elected state governments and the security institutions operating within their jurisdictions.

The question is where lawful executive authority ends and interference in police operations begins.

The Senate’s proposed safeguards include checks on the appointment of state police commissioners. A June analysis by Premium Times described a framework under which governors would appoint commissioners with involvement from the National Police Council and confirmation by the relevant State House of Assembly. The proposed framework also included State Police Service Commissions and procedures for challenging potentially unlawful directives.

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The effectiveness of these arrangements will depend on their final wording, the independence of the bodies applying them and their ability to resist pressure.

A commission that exists on paper but lacks financial independence, investigative capacity or protection from political interference will offer little practical protection.

The same applies to legislative oversight. State lawmakers must be able to investigate complaints and scrutinise police budgets without being constrained by their political relationships with governors.

A state police service needs more than an appointment procedure. It needs an enforceable system for saying no to unlawful orders.

That includes documented operational orders, independent investigation of allegations, transparent disciplinary processes, meaningful remedies for victims and sanctions against officials who interfere with lawful policing.

Adamawa’s rejected clauses raise another question

Adamawa’s consideration of the proposal offers a reminder that constitutional change should not be treated as a race in which speed matters more than scrutiny.

The assembly reportedly approved 24 of 26 clauses, rejecting two because lawmakers considered them insufficiently defined.

Musa Kallam, chairman of the Assembly’s Committee on Information, explained the decision:

“Some of my colleagues were not clear on those clauses, and they decided to reject them. Since they were in the majority, there is nothing we can do.”

Kallam also rejected the assumption that governors would automatically take control of every aspect of state policing, arguing that the proposed constitutional changes placed limits on their powers.

“Let us not jump to the conclusion that state governors will take over when the state police take off,” he said, adding that the National Assembly could amend the Constitution further if necessary to strengthen the system.

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His comments highlight two separate issues.

First, unclear provisions should be resolved through careful legislative examination rather than left to future interpretation by officials who may have competing interests.

Second, constitutional safeguards cannot depend solely on an assurance that a governor will act responsibly. They must be sufficiently precise to prevent abuse, establish who has authority to intervene and provide a remedy when that authority is exceeded.

The fact that lawmakers rejected two clauses is not, by itself, evidence that the wider proposal is defective. It does show why the wording of each provision matters.

Citizens need to know which clauses were rejected, whether the rejection affects the state’s formal approval and how any differences will be handled during the wider constitutional process.

Those are legitimate questions of legislative transparency, not arguments against reform.

The financial gap could determine who receives effective policing

Political independence is only one part of the problem. The other is money.

A properly equipped state police service would require far more than uniforms and patrol vehicles. It would need trained personnel, reliable communications, vehicles, intelligence systems, forensic facilities, weapons management, secure evidence storage, operational bases and a functioning system for handling complaints and investigating crimes.

The recurring costs would be equally important: salaries, pensions, insurance, training, maintenance, fuel, intelligence gathering and the supervision of officers.

The proposed framework described by Premium Times allows for federal grants and financial assistance to state police services, subject to the prescribed institutional and legislative approvals. But that possibility does not, by itself, establish a sustainable funding arrangement for all 36 states.

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States have different revenue bases and competing spending obligations. Those differences could produce major disparities in police capacity.

A relatively wealthy state might invest in modern communications, sophisticated investigations and well-equipped response teams. A fiscally constrained state could struggle to recruit enough officers or sustain basic operations.

The consequences would extend beyond institutional prestige. Residents in poorer states could face slower emergency responses and weaker investigations, even as the constitutional reform promises more accessible policing.

There is also a risk that excessive dependence on discretionary grants could create a new avenue of political influence, this time through funding decisions at the federal level.

The final framework therefore needs to explain how state police services will be financed, how funds will be audited and what protections will prevent political considerations from determining which communities receive operational support.

Budgets should be public. Procurement should be auditable. Police spending should be measured against deployment, staffing, response times and investigative performance.

And state governments should not be allowed to present funding announcements as evidence of improved security without publishing verifiable outcomes.

Who handles a crime that crosses state boundaries?

Decentralisation will not eliminate the need for national coordination.

Kidnapping networks, trafficking operations, organised robbery and other criminal groups can move across state boundaries. Investigations may involve suspects, victims, evidence and financial transactions in several jurisdictions.

A state police force could potentially improve the initial response to a crime committed within its territory. Problems could arise when an investigation requires intelligence sharing, coordinated arrests or evidence held by another state’s police service.

Who takes the lead when two state police services disagree? What happens when a state government refuses to cooperate with an investigation involving politically influential people? Which body resolves disputes over jurisdiction, evidence and command?

The proposed dual structure retains a role for federal policing in matters including counter-terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime, border security, arms trafficking and interstate criminal activity, according to the Senate’s June explanation of the amendment.

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That division of responsibility must be clear enough to prevent gaps in enforcement and reduce unnecessary conflicts between agencies.

A national system would need shared standards for evidence handling, intelligence exchange, suspect transfers and joint investigations. It would also need a clear procedure for determining which agency has responsibility when a crime crosses jurisdictions.

These are operational requirements, not technical details that can be postponed until after state police services become active.

A reform that creates new organisations without making their responsibilities clear could add bureaucracy rather than improve public safety.

The next election cycle will test the safeguards

The potential for political abuse becomes especially important in the run-up to elections.

Police services may be required to protect rallies, manage demonstrations, investigate violence, secure public facilities and respond to complaints about intimidation. Officers may also encounter allegations involving politicians or their supporters.

A state police service that can be directed improperly by the governing party could damage confidence in the electoral process. Selective enforcement, politically motivated arrests or failure to investigate violence against opponents would undermine trust in both policing and democratic institutions.

These are risks that should be addressed before the new system is operational.

The final legislation should make unlawful partisan deployment a clear disciplinary and, where appropriate, criminal matter. Police commanders should have protected channels for reporting improper orders. Citizens should have access to independent complaint mechanisms, and investigations into allegations involving political officeholders should not depend solely on the institutions those officeholders influence.

There should also be publicly available records of police deployment during elections, together with transparent investigations of complaints about the conduct of officers.

This is not an argument that every governor would abuse a state police service. It is an argument that no policing model should depend on the personal restraint of its political leaders.

The same principle applies to federal policing. Abuse is not made acceptable merely because the power is exercised in Abuja rather than in a state capital.

What the final legislation must deliver

The constitutional amendment and the National Policing Bill should be judged against measurable public safety outcomes, not the number of assemblies that endorse them.

Before implementation, lawmakers and the executive should resolve five priorities.

First, publish the complete legislative record. Nigerians need an authenticated state-by-state register of approvals, the exact resolutions passed and the outstanding procedural steps.

Second, strengthen independent oversight. State Police Service Commissions and other oversight institutions must have defined powers, adequate resources and protection from political retaliation. Allegations of police misconduct must be investigated independently and victims must have effective remedies.

Third, establish transparent funding arrangements. State police budgets, procurement, equipment spending and operational performance should be open to scrutiny. The system must address disparities between states without making public safety dependent on discretionary political favour.

Fourth, clarify command and jurisdiction. The legislation should define the boundaries between state and federal police powers, specify when intervention is permitted and establish procedures for cross-state investigations and intelligence sharing.

Fifth, measure results. The public should be able to assess emergency response times, crime investigation outcomes, complaints, disciplinary action, human rights violations and the use of public funds. Without reliable reporting, governments could claim success while the experience of residents remains unchanged.

These are not optional additions to the reform. They are central to its legitimacy.

A new structure is not the same as safer streets

The growing support for state police represents a major moment in Nigeria’s security debate. It offers an opportunity to bring policing closer to communities, improve intelligence gathering and address the limitations of a heavily centralised structure.

But the country’s history demonstrates that neither federal nor local control automatically protects citizens from abuse.

As the Justice Ministry reviews the National Policing Bill and the 29 consequential amendment bills, the public should demand clarity on the final safeguards, the division of powers, the funding model and the institutions responsible for holding officers accountable.

The disagreement over the published tally of state approvals is an immediate transparency problem. The larger challenge is institutional: building a police service that can respond to local threats without becoming answerable to political loyalty rather than the law.

For Nigerians facing kidnapping, violent crime and slow emergency responses, the ultimate measure of the reform will not be how quickly politicians approve it.

It will be whether a citizen can report a crime, receive a timely and professional response, challenge an officer’s unlawful conduct and obtain justice without fear of political retaliation.

Until those protections are embedded in enforceable law and backed by credible institutions, the promise of state police will remain only partly fulfilled.