Sunday Dare’s excoriating social media brief, published on the presidential communication handle and headlined “Between Tinubu’s Capability and the Ignobility of Pseudo Statesmanship,” is both a political counterpunch and a public defence of the Tinubu security narrative.
The brief was an explicit response to recent public interventions by former president Olusegun Obasanjo in which the elder statesman urged decisive action on insecurity and said Nigerians were free to seek international help if the state failed to protect them.
Sunday Dare framed Obasanjo’s intervention as hypocritical and argued that the origins of the jihadist threat predate the current administration.
What Sunday Dare Said And Why It Matters
Dare’s post performs three functions. First it defines the security problem in maximalist terms — a “multilayered terrorist ecosystem” that includes internationally designated organisations, ISIS and al Qaeda linked franchises, local criminal-terror hybrids, cross border cells and ideological insurgents.
Second it shifts the historical blame for the rise of violent Islamist militancy to the period of former president Obasanjo.
Third it defends Tinubu’s mix of kinetic and non kinetic measures and rejects the idea of “subcontracting” internal security to foreign powers.
The statement is political theatre disguised as policy narrative but it matters because it sets the public frame through which the presidency expects to claim legitimacy for its security choices.
The Historical Record Versus The Political Line
There is an historical basis for one of Dare’s core contentions. Boko Haram began as an organised movement in the early 2000s, with Mohammed Yusuf founding the group in 2002 in Maiduguri.
The organisation became overtly violent in 2009 after a confrontation with security forces which produced mass killings, the extrajudicial death of Yusuf and a subsequent insurgent escalation under new leadership.
That timeline places the incubation of the movement within the window of presidents Obasanjo and Yar’Adua and the violent turn in the last year of the Yar’Adua era and the early Jonathan years.
But pointing to origins is not the same as accounting for decades of policy choices, regional spillovers and state capacity deficits that followed. History explains roots, it does not absolve present responsibility.
The Data: Nigeria Is Near The Epicentre Of A Regional Crisis
If Dare’s language is stark it is because the data is stark. Independent monitors and terrorism metrics place Nigeria among the most affected countries in the world.
The 2025 Global Terrorism Index and associated briefings show Nigeria ranking among the worst affected nations and accounting for a material share of global terrorism related deaths.
Meanwhile event based monitors such as ACLED paint a picture of rising incidents and high fatality counts across the North East, North West and North Central zones.
For instance, detailed ACLED and ACCORD compilations for 2024 record thousands of conflict incidents and several thousand fatalities in hotspots such as Borno state.
These are not abstract numbers. They are bodies, displaced communities and collapsing local governance.
Comparing Nigeria To Its Neighbours
A comparative reading of the Global Terrorism Index shows Nigeria sitting alongside Sahel states where IS and al Qaeda affiliates have driven catastrophic fatality rises.
Countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have experienced sudden spikes in deaths linked to jihadi expansion in the same period.
The regional commonality is important. Nigeria’s insecurity cannot be read as purely domestic. Cross border flows of fighters, weapons and ideology have remade conflict dynamics across West and Central Africa.
That is precisely the argument Dare makes when he insists on transnational collaboration but rejects outright outsourcing of domestic security responsibilities.
What Tinubu Has Done So Far And What Sunday Dare Claims
Dare lists Tinubu’s mix of kinetic pressure and non kinetic measures as evidence of a coherent strategy. In government statements and press releases the administration has emphasised military modernisation, intelligence integration, regional cooperation and community level programmes.
Recent steps include the formalisation of a US-Nigeria joint working group for security cooperation and repeated ministerial statements on intelligence integration and force modernisation. These moves are real. Whether they are decisive enough or well timed is the heart of the policy debate.
The Missing Pieces In The Presidency Argument
The presidency’s narrative is credible in broad strokes but it is incomplete in practice. Three gaps stand out.
1. Capacity Not Only Will
Modern equipment and working groups are necessary but not sufficient. Many areas remain ungoverned because of weak local institutions, failed policing models and politicised militia dynamics. Military advances without sustained governance packages will produce temporary gains not durable peace.
2. Accountability For Past Failures
Invoking historical roots of Boko Haram is valid but selective. Leaders across successive governments have failed to build resilient institutions. A forensic accounting of what specific policy failures allowed extremist incubators to remain active between 2002 and 2015 is required if the current administration expects public trust.
3. Clarity On International Partnerships
Dare rejects the idea of “subcontracting” security. Yet the modern reality is that intelligence partnerships, training and targeted foreign support are common across states fighting transnational terror. Denying the utility of strong external partnerships risks politicising an operational necessity. The question is not foreign help or sovereignty. The question is what form of partnership preserves command, oversight and civilian protection.
The Political Theatre Of Blame
Dare’s polemic is also a power play inside an elite debate. A former president publicly urging citizens to seek international help is rhetorically seismic. It moves public expectations and changes the political stakes. The presidency response was therefore inevitable.
But politics should not obscure sober policy evaluation. Branding criticism as “ignoble” or “pseudo statesmanship” is rhetorically effective. It does not replace independent evaluation of policy outputs, timetables and metrics.
What A Measured Strategy Would Look Like
An effective policy approach would combine the following and publish measurable targets.
• Clear time bound security objectives with territorial benchmarks and civilian protection metrics.
• Public disclosure of the scope and limits of any foreign cooperation, ensuring Nigerian command and parliamentarian oversight.
• An integrated governance plan to restore public services, livelihoods and rule of law in retaken communities.
• A transparent accountability review of past administrations to map institutional failures and build corrective reforms.
Between Rhetoric And Results
Sunday Dare’s statement is a determined attempt to reframe the narrative and defend the Tinubu administration at a moment of acute public anxiety.
His historical point has merit. His strategic claims are supported by government initiatives and emerging international cooperation. Yet political rebuttals are not substitutes for measurable results on the ground. Nigerians need fewer epithets and more verifiable progress.
If the presidency intends to convert capability into security, it must turn the rhetorical whole-of-nation line into a measurable, transparent, and accountable campaign that citizens can judge not by press releases but by safer roads, functioning schools, restored towns and accountable security institutions. The rest is politics.
Join the debate; let's know your opinion.