In a scathing rebuttal issued on 2 June 2025, the All Progressives Congress (APC) described former governors Rotimi Amaechi and Nasir El-Rufai, alongside ex-Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, as a “trio united in desperation for self-serving power”.
The statement, signed by APC National Publicity Secretary Felix Morka, lashes out at allegations that President Bola Tinubu’s administration has “weaponised poverty” by failing to eradicate destitution within two years despite inheriting a sluggish economy.
Morka asserts that these accusations are nothing more than hollow criticism from career politicians who themselves presided over prolonged periods of systemic hardship, pointing to their combined 24 years in high office without meaningful progress against poverty.
“Weaponising Poverty”? APC Fires Back at Misplaced Blame
The APC statement was released in reaction to remarks made at a public lecture in Abuja on 31 May 2025, celebrating Chief Rotimi Amaechi’s 60th birthday.
According to the party, the gathering quickly morphed into a spectacle where Amaechi, Atiku, and El-Rufai “showcased their frenzied desperation to grab power purely for self-aggrandisement”.
Morka’s press release asserts that none of the trio, despite occupying Nigeria’s highest offices between 1999 and 2023, ever demonstrated serious commitment to tackling poverty or correcting structural economic distortions.
Instead, he accuses them of “mindless rent-seeking”, disposing of national assets at knockdown prices to cronies, and shielding corrupt practices under the guise of state-led development.
Amaechi’s Record: A Quarter Century of Misplaced Priorities
Rotimi Amaechi’s tenure spans 24 uninterrupted years: eight as Speaker of the Rivers State House of Assembly (1999–2007), eight as Governor of Rivers State (2007–2015), and eight as Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015–2023).
Despite this extensive record, the APC claims there is “absolutely no record of attempting to combat poverty” in his jurisdictions.
Indeed, national poverty levels actually worsened over two decades: by 2023, 56.0% of Nigerians lived under the national poverty line (compared to 40.1% in 2018), equating to roughly 129 million people.
When Amaechi complained “I am hungry” upon leaving office, the APC argues this admission underscores his eagerness to return to “felt-entitled dependency on state resources” rather than genuine empathy for the impoverished.
Tinubu’s Economic Reforms: Bold or Brutal
Market-Driven Naira: Under President Tinubu, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) adopted a unified, market-reflective exchange rate, ending a system of multiple rates that had artificially overvalued the naira.
The previous Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) governments (1999–2015) consistently maintained a pegged naira—often at rates far below market realities—to shield politically sensitive importers and oil marketers.
This policy fuelled chronic shortages of foreign exchange, hampered local manufacturing, and entrenched import dependency, thereby exacerbating poverty.
GDP Surge Amid High Inflation: The World Bank reported that Nigeria’s GDP expanded by 4.6% year-on-year in Q4 2024—its strongest growth in a decade—largely attributed to Tinubu’s subsidy removals, naira reforms, and improved fiscal management.
Government revenue rose by 4.5% of GDP in 2024, enabling a reduction in the fiscal deficit from 5.4% in 2023 to 3% in 2024.
Nevertheless, headline inflation soared to over 32.7% by September 2024, with food inflation surpassing 40%.
Critics point out that Tinubu’s reforms have inflicted acute pain on ordinary Nigerians—fuel prices surged by over 200% immediately after subsidy removal—yet the government insists these sacrifices are necessary to reset the economy on a sustainable trajectory.
Fuel Subsidy Removal: A Double-Edged Sword
Eliminating fuel subsidies was among Tinubu’s first major acts. Prior to May 2023, Nigeria allocated nearly ₦3 trillion annually to keep pump prices artificially low, a burden that benefited a few politically connected importers.
The subsidy regime had become synonymous with corruption: Nigeria spent an estimated $9.5 billion on subsidies in 2022 alone, yet domestic refineries were rot-fast and non-functional.
As of June 2024, a litre of petrol peaked at ₦780, up from ₦195 in May 2023, contributing to an 18-month streak where inflation climbed relentlessly from 22.41% to over 34.19% in June 2024.
While Tinubu’s camp credits the move for halting perennial fuel shortages, eliminating queue culture, and sparking renewed private investment into the downstream sector, detractors highlight the surge in transportation and logistics costs, which swiftly transmitted into higher food and commodity prices for end-users.
Poverty, Inequality, and Responses: Who’s Accountable?
PDP vs. Poverty: Who Failed Whom?
Felix Morka’s press statement explicitly blames the 16-year PDP interlude for allowing the naira to remain grossly overvalued, thereby suffocating local production and entrenching a consumption-led economy.
Indeed, data from the World Bank suggests that in 2022–23, Nigeria’s poverty headcount soared from 77 million (40% of the population) to 104 million (51.1%), owing to inflationary shocks, flooding, insecurity, and the COVID-19 downturn.
However, critics of Tinubu argue that sweeping reforms could have been more gradual, easing the burden on the most vulnerable—particularly when two-thirds of Nigerian households spend over half their income on food.
Cash Transfer and “People-Centred” Programmes
Since inflation outpaced earnings in 2023, successive administrations—both PDP and APC—have sporadically employed cash transfers and social safety nets.
Buhari introduced the National Social Investment Programmes (NSIP) in 2015, including N-Power, the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT), and the Home Grown School Feeding Programme.
Under Tinubu, the National Cash Transfer Programme was expanded to reach 20 million households, each slated to receive ₦100 000 annually in three tranches. Yet, reports indicate that as of early 2025, only about 8 million households had fully received disbursements, owing to logistical bottlenecks and funding constraints.
Critics allege that such interventions are tokenistic—intended more to mollify discontent than to create pathways out of poverty.
With three-quarters of Nigeria’s labour force engaged in informal, subsistence activities, cash transfers alone do little to address structural unemployment, skills deficits, or regional inequalities.
Meanwhile, the APC counters that Tinubu’s reforms—particularly currency liberalisation and subsidy removals—are indispensable foundational steps toward incentivising local production, attracting foreign direct investment, and ultimately generating sustainable jobs.
Industrialisation and Diversification: Dangote Refinery as the Beacon of Hope?
A flagship project exemplifying the new “production-oriented” narrative is the Dangote Petroleum Refinery in Lekki.
Inaugurated in May 2023, this $19 billion refinery is equipped to process 650 000 barrels per day, surpassing the combined output of Nigeria’s four public refineries, which have been dysfunctional for decades.
The facility has generated over 120 000 direct jobs and an estimated 100 000 indirect roles in logistics, petrochemicals, and allied sectors.
By mid-2025, Dangote’s exports of aviation kerosene and diesel to neighbouring countries are projected to reach $3 billion, reducing fuel import bills by 90% and expanding foreign reserves.
Proponents assert that the refinery will spur local downstream industries—steel, polymers, fertilisers—thereby fostering backward linkages essential to lasting economic transformation.
According to a 2024 estimate by Data Services & Resources Ltd., Dangote Refinery’s full capacity could raise Nigeria’s GDP from $234 billion in 2023 to $304 billion in 2024, with potential to reach $412 billion by 2028.
Such catalytic projects could help tilt the economy away from chronic oil dependency (oil contributed just 4.6% of GDP in Q4 2024) toward a diversified industrial base.
Yet, not even Dangote’s juggernaut is without caveats. Observers note that its success remains contingent on reliable gas supplies, improvements in power infrastructure, and the resolution of maritime corridor security risks.
Moreover, environmental and community concerns—especially in coastal villages near Lagos—highlight the human costs of forced evictions, habitat destruction, and possible pollution risks
“Self-serving Politicians” Vs “National Interest”: The Road Ahead
The APC’s narrative paints Amaechi, Atiku, and El-Rufai as mere opportunists clinging to anachronistic, rent-seeking economic practices—villains of a long-running drama marked by corruption, stagnation, and social unrest.
In contrast, Tinubu’s “reformists” are depicted as reluctant heroes steering Nigeria toward the promised “New Dawn”.
There is, however, a clash of perceptions: to many Nigerians, soaring hunger, chronic insecurity, and rampant inflation under Tinubu have felt indistinguishable from the hardships under previous regimes.
Key Data Points to Watch
Poverty Prevalence: From 40.1% in 2018 to over 56% in 2023, rising again to an estimated 60% in early 2025 due to inflationary pressures.
Inflation: 32.7% nation-wide in September 2024, with food inflation surpassing 40%.
GDP Growth: 4.6% in Q4 2024—strongest in a decade—but overall 3.4% for full-year 2024, short of the 6% target.
Trade Balance: $6.83 billion surplus in 2024, after years of deficits, driven by reduced fuel imports and rising non-oil exports.
Unemployment: National rate estimated at 33.3% in Q1 2025, with youth unemployment over 42%.
What Nigerians Expect
For most citizens, the debate over who “enabled” poverty matters less than tangible improvements in living standards. As of mid-2025:
Minimum Wage vs. Cost of Living: A new federal minimum wage of ₦70 000 (introduced in April 2024) is effectively worth just $45 monthly, given a naira trading at ₦1 550 to $1 in the parallel market. Meanwhile, food baskets that cost ₦16 955 in March 2024 now demand over ₦20 274—forcing families to spend nearly 29% of their wages on a single pot of jollof rice.
Social Protections: Government palliatives—food-stuffs, subsidised grains, conditional cash transfers—cover only about 7 million of the poorest households, leaving tens of millions without meaningful relief.
Security and Infrastructure: Insecurity in the Northwest and Middle Belt, poor road networks, and erratic power supply continue to deter private investment and raise the cost of doing business.
Conclusion: Reforms or Ruses?
The APC’s trenchant statement presents a narrative of a “rentier triumvirate” crying wolf at Tinubu’s reforms, arguing that self-serving politicians are alarmed by the dismantling of the very system that enriched them.
The party has carefully woven data and anecdotes—4.6% Q4 2024 growth, trade surpluses, Dangote’s refinery, rising minimum wages—to showcase its achievements and to discredit critics as “economic exploiters”.
Yet, for an electorate battered by skyrocketing inflation (32.15% as of August 2024) and surging poverty (estimated 60% in early 2025), such triumphalism can ring hollow without visible improvements in daily livelihoods.
Whether Tinubu’s bold policies will ultimately recalibrate Nigeria toward sustainable growth depends on multiple variables: consistent application of monetary and fiscal discipline, broad-based job creation, retooling of educational and industrial policies, and effective social safety nets.
For Amaechi, Atiku, El-Rufai, and Peter Obi, the accusation of perpetuating “import-dependent systems” taps into genuine grievances among millions of Nigerians struggling to afford basic staples.
To dismiss their criticisms as mere “special interests” risks alienating a populace yearning for accountable governance and equitable development.
As political jousting intensifies ahead of the 2027 elections, the real battle will centre on who can credibly articulate and implement policies that deliver both immediate relief and long-term prosperity.
Until then, the struggle between “reformists” and “rent-seekers” will define the next chapter of Nigeria’s tempestuous journey toward inclusive growth.
Additional reporting from Osaigbovo Okungbowa & Kalada Jumbo
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